

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XXXV

JANUARY, 1942

NUMBER 1

A TARSIAN PECULIARITY (DIO PRUS. OR. 33) WITH AN UNNOTICED FRAGMENT OF PORPHYRY

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THE appearance of a new volume of Dio Chrysostom in the Loeb Classical Library seems to be an appropriate occasion to discuss a curious problem in the first oration addressed to the people of Tarsus.¹ It has puzzled the translator, Professor H. Lamar Crosby, and there was little to help him in the work done by earlier students of Dio. The passages that bear most directly upon the point are not to be found in the books and articles that deal with the orator, and it is only because the demands of other studies have led me to explore a number of patristic texts that I am able to go somewhat beyond previous writers in explaining an odd and unrefreshing phenomenon of ancient manners.

In the first sentence of the oration Dio speaks as if he were addressing the Tarsians in response to their invitation. This may be a mere fiction; but proceeding as if it were true, he takes an informal attitude towards the audience, asking them in gentle raillery what they expect from a speaker like himself, warning them not to look for the conventional eulogy of their city, and approaching his theme indirectly through the suggestion that friendly criticism may be worth more to them than the praise of which certain poets and orators were so lavish. "It is not river or plain or harbor that makes a city prosperous, nor quantity of riches or multitude of houses or treasures of the gods . . . rather it is sobriety and common sense that save it" (§ 28).

To such commonplaces, with many repetitions and digres-

¹ Dio Chrysostom: with an English translation by J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. Volume III, 1940. See particularly Crosby's introduction to Or. 33 (p. 273).

sions, Dio gives up almost half his speech; and after this long and wandering introduction the parturient mountain brings forth a mouse — or so it seems to the casual modern reader. What Dio censures in the Tarsians is, he says, that in their waking hours they act as if they were asleep. Leaving that to be pondered for a moment, he comes out presently with his real meaning, which is that they snore, or snort. All classes of the population make this unpleasant sound; at all times and occasions; it pervades the whole city, though he implies that there are some who ridicule or rebuke the offenders (§§ 32–34). The word that Dio uses to describe this sound is *ρέγκειν*, snore; but since he is speaking of waking behavior, “snort” may be more accurate. At any rate, his language in this passage and elsewhere in the oration indicates a harsh, disgusting sound produced by violent inhalation or exhalation through the nose.

It is well known that the later sophists were accustomed to display their virtuosity by delivering lectures or orations, often improvised, upon the most trivial subjects. One could understand how a known and popular speaker, invited to address a friendly audience, might choose to give vent to an ironical tirade against some notorious mannerism or peccadillo of his hearers; he might even venture to lecture them in schoolmasterly fashion about some boorish offense against refined manners. What one does not readily understand is why Dio, instead of treating the bad habit of the Tarsians merely as a rudeness, makes it plain that to his ears, and the ears of most Greeks, it was far worse than an ordinary social impropriety; it suggested bestially immoral misconduct. To this point we must shortly return.

But if the impropriety of which the Tarsians were guilty could be viewed in so unfavorable a light, how would they feel when so berated for indecent behavior? The question has perplexed other students of Dio. Burckhardt thought that the hearers would scarcely have permitted the speaker to finish an address so loaded with reproaches.² Lemarchand holds that the speech was neither intended nor taken seriously — that it

² Ueber den Werth des Dion Chrysostom für die Kenntniss seiner Zeit. *Neues schweizerisches Museum*, IV, 1864, p. 119. This work is not accessible to me, and I report the author's opinion on the authority of Lemarchand (next note).

was in fact a parody of the harsh sermonizing with which Cynic philosophers regaled those who gathered round them at cross-roads and in other public places. He finds support for this view in what he considers proof that the discourse was not delivered once for all, but on three different occasions; for he holds that the numerous repetitions of similar ideas give evidence that there were three different recensions, which have been clumsily combined by some editor of Dio's literary remains. Two of the versions were therefore fictitious — not actually spoken before a Tarsian audience — and probably all three.³

How far Lemarchand's ingenious tracing of three recensions should be accepted, and how far the repetitions may be due to Dio's well-known habit of "wandering in his discourse," is a question that need not be argued here. Some of the points that Lemarchand makes may be conceded. No doubt Dio exaggerated the prevalence of the reprehensible habit, and if he actually gave the speech before the Tarsians, he may have taken some of the sting out of his strictures by delivering them half-seriously, with a wry smile. Yet even on this assumption, his audience must have been surprisingly insensitive to language which was hardly the less insulting because it was uttered in a bantering manner. The real problem is, did an undeniably boorish and offensive act really suggest to Dio, and as he tells us, to other Greeks, a revolting indecency, or has he simply gone quite beyond the bounds of truth in order to give weight to his censure?

It may be well to remember that there are certain social taboos which come, through various associations, sometimes obscure, to be felt with a keenness and enforced with a severity that cannot be accounted for by considering the offending act or word in a matter of fact way. In England the word bloody, although used in many passages of noble poetry, and indispensable in certain circumstances, has come, through vulgar abuse in vituperation, to be so frowned upon that finicky people hesitate to employ it even where the situation seems to require it. The German *Schafskopf* seems to a foreigner to be

³ L. Lemarchand, *Dion de Pruse: Les œuvres d'avant l'exil* (Paris, 1926), pp. 125-126.

a harmless epithet that might be applied petulantly to a stupid person; and yet, if such things are still viewed as they were forty, or even twenty, years ago, a person who applies this name to another is punishable in German courts. To seize an Arab by his beard is not merely a rude assault, but an unpardonable insult. In a curious essay called "Les pieds pudiques" Salomon Reinach called attention to the horror with which highborn Spanish ladies of the seventeenth century viewed the possibility that their feet might be seen by a man.⁴ Victorian prudery about exposure of the legs is well remembered, though it was never manifested in so extreme a form.⁵

Now Dio's language leaves no room for doubt that the Tarsian impropriety suggested to him the grossest indecency. He says that if a man, in passing a house, hears such a sound from within as the Tarsians are in the habit of making, he will think the place a brothel (36). He compares the outrageous behavior to that of a man who would point at everything with the middle finger,⁶ or who walked with his clothes drawn up as if he were wading in a pool (37). This second sort of misbehavior is one of the marks of Theophrastus' *βδελυρός* (Char. 11). But Dio would probably have considered that *βδελυρία* was a mild term to describe actions proper to degenerates addicted to unnatural vice (36, 60; cf. also 54). Is his feeling an indication of a certain pruriency of mind on his own part, which so obsessed him that in reproving a venial rudeness he was led into outrageous exaggeration? To this suggestion a negative answer must be given; for there is evidence that other serious men felt as he did about the impropriety that he castigated in the Tarsians, and that the feeling continued for centuries after Dio's time. The following passages make this plain.

Tatian (adv. Graecos 22), complaining of the unseemly behavior of actors or mimes, says: *ῥιναυλοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ λαλοῦσι τὰ αἰσχρά, κινοῦνται δὲ κινήσεις ὥς οὐκ ἐχρήν, καὶ τοὺς ὅπως δεῖ*

⁴ In his *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, I, 105-110.

⁵ See Miss Mowcher's ironical sally when she has to mount upon a table: "If either of you saw my ankles, say so, and I'll go home and destroy myself" (Dickens, *David Copperfield*, Ch. 22).

⁶ *Digitus infamis*; see, for example, Schol. Ar. Nub. 653, Pers. 2. 33, Juv. 10. 53, and Sittl, *Gebärden der Griechen und Römer*, 101, 123.

μοιχεύειν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς σοφιστεύοντας αἱ θυγατέρες καὶ οἱ παῖδες θεωροῦσι.

Clement of Alexandria (Paed. 3. 29. 2-3) condemns this objectionable conduct even more vehemently and describes it more precisely: αἱ δὲ ἀνδρογύνων συνουσίαις ἥδονται, παρεισρέουσι δὲ ἔνδον κιναίδων ὄχλοι ἀθυρόγλωσσοι, μιαιοὶ μὲν τὰ σώματα, μιαιοὶ δὲ τὰ φθέγματα, εἰς ὑπουργίας ἀκολάστους ἠνδρωμένοι, μοιχείας διάκονοι, κιχλίζοντες καὶ ψιθυρίζοντες καὶ τὸ πορνικὸν ἀνέδην εἰς ἀσέλγειαν διὰ ῥινῶν ἐπιψοφούντες ἐπικιναίδισμα, ἀκολάστοις ῥήμασι καὶ σχήμασι τέρπειν πειρώμενοι καὶ εἰς γέλωτα ἐκκαλούμενοι πορνείας πρόδρομον· ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὑπεκκαίμενοι διὰ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ὀργήν, ἤτοι πόρνοι αὐτοὶ ἢ καὶ κιναίδων ὄχλον εἰς ὄλεθρον ἐζηλωκότες, ἐπικροτοῦσι τῇ ῥινὶ βατράχων δίκην, καθάπερ ἔνοικον τοῖς μυκτῆρσι τὴν χόλην κεκτημένοι.

No words could make the indecent associations of this nasal misbehavior plainer; but it may be noted that here and in some other places it is implied that the noise was sometimes a coarse manifestation of anger. So in a fourth-century papyrus⁷ an aggrieved wife lodges a complaint against her husband, saying that she went to the church on the Sabbath (ἐν σαμβάθῳ), and he caused the doors of the church to be closed against her, saying διὰ τί ἀπῆλθας εἰς τὸ κυριακόν; καὶ πολλὰ ἀσελγήματα λέγων εἰς πρόσωπόν μου καὶ διὰ τῆς ῥινὸς αὐτοῦ. Grenfell and Hunt remark in their note that speaking through the nose aggravated the insult; but it is likely that more than a mere nasal tone of voice is meant. The use of the phrase διὰ ῥινός here and in Clement indicates that Sylburg and Otto were right in reading *διαρρινούντες* in Justin's description of the mockery of Christ on the cross — τὰς κεφαλὰς ἕκαστος ἐκίνουν καὶ τὰ χεῖλη διέστρεφον καὶ τοῖς μυξωτῆρσιν ἐν ἀλλήλοις διαρρινούντες ἔλεγον, κτλ.⁸

Theodoret (Eccl. Hist. 4. 22, 4) cites a letter in which Peter, the successor of Athanasius in the Alexandrian bishopric, describes the rioting under the Arian usurper Lucius. The follow-

⁷ Oxyrhynchus Papyri VI, no. 903, 19-22. *σαμβάθῳ*, for *σαββάτῳ*, is Schubart's correction; the editors had printed *Σαμβαθώ* as if it were a place name.

⁸ Dial. 101. 3. The manuscript reading is *διερρινούντες*.— In the notes on pp. 87-88 of his *Gebärden*, Sittl gathers together a number of passages illustrating the expression of anger and contempt by the nose. One curious example (p. 88, n. 6) should be noted in connection with the Tarsian snorting. A note of Remigius on Sedulius (p. 359, 14 Huemer) reads: *Sanna est obscenus sonitus narium, unde et pro irrisione ponitur.*

ing sentence has to do with the outrageous conduct of a lewd mob: *Αὐτοὶ τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὀργῆς σκεύη τυγχάνοντες κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν, τὴν ῥίνα σιμώνσαντες, ψόφον ἀσελγῇ ἀπὸ τῶν μυκτῆρων μακρόν, καὶ ἔν' οὕτως εἶπω, ὡς ἀπὸ κρουνοῦ προχέοντες, τὴν μὲν ἐσθῆτα διέρρησσον τῶν ἁγίων τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρθένων, ὧν ἡ ἄσκησις τύπον ἁγίων (ἁγγέλων) ἐχαρακτήριζεν.*

Sophronius of Damascus, who became patriarch of Jerusalem in 634, wrote a work of some length on the miracles of the Egyptian martyrs Cyrus and John.⁹ Chapter 31 of this book tells how, just after taking the sacrament, a young man named Theodore, being angered for some reason, not only uttered outrageous insults against the man who had provoked him, but also accompanied his words with the taboo sound. He was stricken blind immediately and did not recover his sight until his penitence had won the miraculous intervention of the martyrs in his favor. The passage is as follows:

ὁ νεανίας Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς παρουσίας ἡμῖν διηγήσεως αἴτιος, μεγάλης ὠφελείας γίνεται πρόξενος τοῖς οὐ παρέργως τῶν λεγομένων ἀκούουσι· οὗτος γὰρ εἰς τὸ τῶν ἁγίων γενόμενος τέμενος, μετὰ τὴν τῶν ζωοποιῶν Χριστοῦ μυστηρίων μετάληψιν, ὅθεν οὐκ ἴσμεν κινούμενος, εἴτε τινὸς αὐτὸν πρὸς θυμὸν παροτρύνοντος, μανίᾳ μεγίστῃ φλεγόμενος, καὶ ζέων τῇ κινήσει τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν καχλάζοντος αἵματος, οὐ λόγοις μόνοις τὸ θεῖον ὁ δέιλαιος ὕβρισε δυσφημῶν ὁ τρισάθλιος, καὶ ὡς κατὰ συνδούλου τινὸς τὰς λοιδορίας ποιούμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ διὰ ῥινῶν ἀναῤῥοφήσει τοῦ πνεύματος κτύπον ἀποτελῶν βροντῇ φοβερᾷ παραπλήσιον, τὸν φρίττειν εὐθὺς ἀναγκάζοντα πάντας τοὺς παρόντας καὶ βλέποντας, καὶ τοῖς ὡσὶν ἀκουσίως ἀκούοντας· πολλοὶ δὲ τοῦτο Χριστιανῶν διαπράττονται, βλασφημεῖν ὡς οἶμαι νομίζοντες, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ παντελῶς τὸ πραττόμενον, ὅπερ ἀκριβῶς εἰ ἐγίνωσκον, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸ μετὰ μυρίας βασάνους εἰργάσαντο.

In the clause near the end of this paragraph I suspect that οὐ has been carelessly omitted before *νομίζοντες*. Otherwise the word *βλασφημεῖν*, which in Christian writings usually denotes irreverent or insulting language directed towards divine things, must be taken in the weaker sense of revile, abuse, applied to

⁹ Cited here (with orthographical corrections) from the edition of Mai, *Spicilegium Romanum*, Tom. III, 319-321; the text is also printed in Migne, PG LXXXVII, 3, 3521.

ordinary persons or things. A further comment of Sophronius upon the misbehavior of the young Theodore is reserved for discussion under a separate heading.

In view of this evidence, ranging from the second to the seventh century, we must acquit Dio of any merely personal prejudice or obsession against the Tarsian impropriety. It is clear that sober and well-behaved people continued to regard it with a disgust that verged upon horror; and it is also clearly indicated that this feeling was based upon some conscious or unconscious association between the tabooed behavior and the pathology of the sexual act. The subject is not one to be pursued here. It appears that Eduard Schwartz perceived the significant point, because in the index of words at the end of his edition of Tatian he refers to a curious note of F. Marx on Lucilius, which bears upon the matter.¹⁰

The question how an audience would be affected by such an oration as the first Tarsian is still not answered. There can be no doubt that if the address was intended and accepted as a serious rebuke, it would not have been repeated at Tarsus or elsewhere. Those who believe that three recensions can be traced in it, and accept the corollary, that the attack was not meant seriously and the circumstances may be fictitious, have still to face an unsatisfactory situation. For one would expect that a speech composed as a *jeu d'esprit* and given on more than one occasion would be aimed at some amusing whim or excusable eccentricity, and that the chastisement would be administered with a light hand. But Dio is here attributing an objectionable impropriety to a large populace, and censuring it in terms suited to the moral delinquency that it suggested to his mind. If it is a parody of a Cynic lecture, Dio's taste is as deplorable as that of the Cynics themselves. On the whole, I find it easier to believe that Dio's relations with the Tarsians were such that he could venture to rebuke them in all seriousness, and that the doublets and repetitions are due in part to his loose style of composition, and in part, it may be, to the fact

¹⁰ See Eduard Schwartz's edition of Tatian (in TU IV), p. 96, s.v. *ῥωαυλεῖν*; F. Marx, *Stud. Luciliana*, p. 2 and more fully in his edition of Lucilius, II, 106-107 (on 7. 284); "agitur de homine amore perditio qui ἀσθμαίνει in re venerea."

that he had made trial drafts of certain paragraphs, which his editor clumsily incorporated into the finished speech. So far as this oration is concerned, different recensions, as I conceive the matter, existed only in this limited sense.

AN UNNOTICED FRAGMENT OF PORPHYRY

Immediately after the passage cited above from Sophronius, the author enters upon an explanation of the horror with which a Christian would view the conduct of the youth Theodore. This explanation must be cited in full, and I add a translation in which no effort is made to improve upon the style of the original.

καὶ τάχα διασαφεῖν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἀνόνητον· ἴσως γάρ τινες μανθάνοντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ποιότητα, καὶ ὡς Ἑλληνικῆς ἔστι δυσσεβείας ἐπάξιον εὔρημα, τῆς τοιαύτης ἑαυτοὺς φρενοβλαβείας φυλάξαι· τοὺς Ἑλληνας φησὶν ὁ Πορφύριος τὰς ἑναγεῖς θυσίας τοῖς εἰδώλοις προσφέροντας ῥινοκτυπεῖν ἐντονώτατα, ὀλκῇ βιαία καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ πνεύματος τὸν τοιόνδε κτύπον προφέροντας, ὕμνον ποιεῖσθαι σεβάσμιον, ὡς ἐντεῦθεν πολλὴν ἔχειν τοὺς θύοντας ἄδειαν, καὶ τὴν ἄμιλλαν ζηλοῦν ἱκανώτατα, τίς ῥινοκτυπία νικήσει τὸν ἕτερον, ἢν' ὁ βέλτιστος πρῶτος ἀκούοιτο, καὶ δαίμοσιν ὑπάρχοι γλυκύτατος· αὕτη τῶν τοίωνδε κτύπων ἡ ποιότης καθέστηκεν πρὸς θεραπείαν δαιμόνων ὑπάρξασα, καὶ δαίμονας ἀκαθάρτους ὕμνῳ λεληθότως τοὺς προεμένους αὐτὴν ἀναγκάζουσα· ὅθεν τοὺς ταύτην χρωμένους προτρέπομεν, μαθόντας αὐτῆς τὸ βλαπτικὸν καὶ ὀλέθριον, ὡς ψυχοφθόρου λύττης ἀφίστασθαι.

"And perhaps it may be not unprofitable to explain this evil thing; for possibly some people, when they learn its nature, and understand that it is an invention worthy of heathen impiety, may guard themselves against such madness. Porphyry says that when the Greeks offer their accursed sacrifices to their idols, they make a very loud noise through their noses, producing this sound with a violent inhalation and the power of the breath, to make a hymn of reverence, so that thereupon the participants in the rite indulge in full license, and engage very vigorously in a contest to see which shall outdo the other in these nasal blasts, that the best man may be heard first and may be most pleasing to the demons. This sort of noise is a regular part of their service of demons, and it makes those who utter it

praise unclean demons without knowing it. Wherefore we exhort those who indulge in it, now that they understand its harmful and ruinous character, to depart from it as from a madness that corrupts the soul."

It is obvious that the language of this passage is not Porphyry's, but that of the hostile and ironical patriarch, and that if any of the matter goes back to Porphyry, it is contained in the words beginning *τοὺς Ἑλληνάς φησιν* and ending with *γλυκύτατος*. In fact, some may consider *προφέροντας* an even more likely lower limit, thus excluding the notion of a contest in this extraordinary conduct as an exaggeration due to Sophronius. There seems to be nothing in the remains of Porphyry that fully accounts for the statement imputed to him; and the question arises whether Sophronius' learned explanation is a mere garbling of some vaguely remembered words of the philosopher, or whether it represents a genuine bit of antiquarian lore that Porphyry found somewhere in the course of his researches.

Porphyry was certainly interested in the ancient belief that the gods took pleasure in inhaling the savor of animal burnt offerings, although he himself, strongly disapproving of such sacrifices, attributes this taste not to the gods but to the evil demons. οὗτοι (sc. οἱ κακοὶ δαίμονες) οἱ χαίροντες 'λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε' δι' ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ πνευματικὸν καὶ σωματικὸν πιαίνεται. ζῆ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάσεσι ποικίλως διὰ τῶν ποικίλων, καὶ δυναμοῦται ταῖς ἐκ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ σαρκῶν κνίσαις· διὸ συνετὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ σῶφρων εὐλαβηθήσεται τοιαύταις χρῆσθαι θυσίαις δι' ὧν ἐπισπάσεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τοὺς τοιούτους.¹¹

In another passage, cited by Eusebius, Porphyry deals with a similar subject in curious detail.¹² After saying that every house is full of evil demons, which beset and infest even the bodies of men, he continues: *σιτουμένων γὰρ ἡμῶν προσίασι καὶ προσζάνουσι τῷ σώματι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἱ ἀγνείαι, οὐ διὰ τοὺς θεοὺς προηγούμεως, ἀλλ' ἔν' οὗτοι ἀποστῶσι. μάλιστα δὲ αἷματι χαίρουσι καὶ ταῖς ἀκαθαρσίαις, καὶ ἀπολαύουσι τούτων εἰσδύνοντες τοῖς χρωμέ-*

¹¹ De abstinentia 2. 42-43.

¹² Flatulence caused by demons invading the body; de philosophia ex oraculis haurienda, in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 4. 22 (p. 174d-175a).

νοις. ὅλως γὰρ ἡ ἐπίτασις τῆς πρὸς τι ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ὀρέξεως ὁρμὴ ἀλλαχόθεν οὐ σφοδρύνεται ἢ ἐκ τῆς τούτων παρουσίας· οἱ καὶ εἰς ἀσήμους φθόγγους καὶ φύσας ἀναγκάζουσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐμπίπτειν διὰ τῆς συναπολαύσεως τῆς μετ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένης. ὅπου γὰρ πνεύματος πλείονος ὀλκή, ἢ τῆς γαστρὸς ἐξ ἡδυπαθείας πεπρησμένης, ἢ τῆς προθυμίας δι' ἡδονῆς ἐπίτασιν ἐκφυσώσης καὶ πολὺ τὸ ἔξωθεν σπώσης, ἐκεῖ παρουσία τῶν τοιούτων πνευμάτων σοι δηλούσθω.

These passages may throw some light upon the words that Sophronius attributes to Porphyry, and there are some resemblances between the language of Sophronius and that of the fragment in Eusebius, as the following sentences show.

Sophr.: ὀλκῇ βιαία καὶ δυνάμει τοιόνδε κτύπον προφέροντας.

Porph.: ὅπου γὰρ πνεύματος πλείονος ὀλκή . . . ἐκεῖ παρουσία τῶν τοιούτων πνευμάτων σοι δηλούσθω.

Sophr.: αὕτη τῶν τοιῶνδε κτύπων ἡ ποιότης . . . δαίμονας ἀκαθάρτους ὑμνῶν . . . τοὺς προεμένους αὐτὴν ἀναγκάζουσα.

Porph.: οἱ καὶ εἰς ἀσήμους φθόγγους καὶ φύσας ἀναγκάζουσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐμπίπτειν.

However, these passages do not explain the fact that Sophronius attributes to Porphyry a definite statement about a Greek sacrificial custom. The patriarch is not likely to have invented it, though he may have represented an ancient local oddity as a regular feature of Greek sacrificial procedure; and he may have heightened the absurdity of this ritual snuffing by describing it as a kind of contest among the worshippers. On the whole it seemed quite possible that we have a small fragment of Porphyry in a paraphrase by Sophronius. If it is a genuine fragment, it may perhaps belong to the Quaestiones Homericae, possibly as a note on Iliad 9. 499–501 or some other passage where *κνίσση* is mentioned. But in view of the bulk of Porphyry's writings such conjectures are scarcely worth while.

There remains the question whether there can be any truth in the strange statement that Sophronius ascribes to Porphyry. Certainly so ridiculous a custom, if it ever prevailed widely, would have been gradually dropped as old-fashioned, *Διπολιώδες*. Yet in some out of the way corner of the Greek world it might have persisted long enough to be noted by the curious

antiquarian whom we should have to assume as Porphyry's authority. Granted that possibility, there may be a way to explain the custom. When the altar-fire was beginning to consume the offering and the savory smoke was rising, the participants in the sacrifice might inhale vigorously, partly to show their own pleasure in the odor, partly to invite the gods to enjoy the savor which was their particular part in the feast. Such a custom, quaint as it seems, is scarcely stranger than smacking the lips to show pleasure upon tasting food, and loud eructation to show satisfaction at the close of a meal; and such actions are, or were, regarded as proper among certain peoples who have not been influenced by western European ideas of table manners.¹³ Snuffing the savor of the burnt offering would, after all, be less surprising behavior than the use of curses and abusive language at a sacrifice, of which we have evidence in more than one place.¹⁴

¹³ Some Arabs inhale audibly as they drink, by way of showing their enjoyment; and in the *Thousand and One Nights* the sixth brother of the barber of Baghdad shows his appreciation of the imaginary feast by clicking his tongue against his palate. Chinese of the higher class have been known to indicate their satisfaction after a meal in the other manner mentioned above.

¹⁴ In connection with a sacrifice to Heracles at Lindus in Rhodes; the sources, as well as interesting parallels, are cited by Frazer in his translation of Apollodorus in the Loeb Library (Apollod. 2. 118 Wagner; Vol. I, 226, n. 3, Frazer). At a sacrifice to Apollo on the island of Anaphe the women and men indulged in mutual raillery (Apoll. Rhod. 4. 1727 ff.); other more or less similar customs are mentioned by Mooney in his note on the passage.

THE ENDING OF ST. MARK'S GOSPEL

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IN The Gospel according to St. Luke ¹ the late Professor Creed accepted the view of Welhausen and Meyer ² that the original version of Mark was intended to close with the words ἐφοβοῦντο γάρ. The view avoids the difficulty of explaining the fact that neither Matthew nor Luke knows any other ending; it is certainly hard to see how a document could have gained so wide a circulation that the authors of these two Gospels knew it, and yet had at some previous date been so little known that the only surviving copy had lost its original ending.

The difficulty is not insuperable. It is possible that Mark died before he had time to complete his work, i.e., that the Gospel always ended thus, but was not intended to do so. Or an accident may have happened to the original copy. "At Rome in Nero's days a variety of accidents were by way of occurring to Christians and their possessions."³ There is nothing inherently impossible in either explanation; but there is undoubtedly much force in Creed's contention that the difficulties are weighty enough to discourage resort to the conjecture that the text is incomplete, unless we are compelled to do so by the document itself.⁴

I propose to argue that we are in fact compelled to do so. Meyer explains the abrupt ending as due to "holy awe" (*heilige Scheu*), but he adduces no parallels. Creed admits ⁵ that the ending "is abrupt as a conclusion to the Gospel (yet not much more abrupt than its beginning), but it is a good conclusion to the paragraph." With the question of the ending of a paragraph I shall deal shortly; it is necessary here to point

¹ 314 ff., and cf. his article in J. T. S., XXI, 122, pp. 175 ff. (Jan. 1930).

² *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, I, 17 ff.

³ Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, 338. [On the possibility of ordinary loss in an early codex form, cf. H. A. Sanders, *University of Michigan Quarterly Review*, Winter 1938, pp. 119 ff. Cf. also C. C. McCown, *HTR*, XXXIV, p. 239 f.]

⁴ J. T. S., loc. cit.

⁵ The Gospel according to St. Luke, loc. cit.

out that the implied argument that, if Mark could end abruptly, he could also begin abruptly, cannot be maintained. "The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ" as an opening falls into line with the normal openings of the prophetic books, e.g., "The word of the Lord which came to Joel, the son of Pethuel." The form may be expanded by a date or genealogy, but often it is not. It is not confined to the prophets; Nehemiah opens in the same way in the Hebrew; in the LXX Nehemiah appears as II Ezra 11, but with so clear a break from what precedes it as to constitute practically a new book; Tobit has a beginning whose abruptness is only modified by the insertion of a genealogy and a date. For such beginnings we can find at least one classical parallel in Greek.⁶ Thus the implied argument falls to the ground, unless we can find parallels for an equally abrupt ending.

Professor Lightfoot endeavors to do so.⁷ His parallels prove abundantly that Mark might have ended a sentence in this way. But they do not prove that he could have ended a paragraph thus; the only parallels which he quotes for this are drawn from dialogues and letters. From dialogues he quotes Plato, Protagoras 328 c and Gorgias, 466 A, and Justin Martyr, Dial. c. Tryph. 32, 249, C; the last of these comes from an interpellation by Trypho, i.e., from one of the bits of dialogue with which Justin endeavors without much success to modify the interminable monotony of his book of Testimonies; from letters he quotes Pap. Zenon., I. 590. 82. 11 ff., B. G. U. IV. 1097, Pap. Ox. IX. 1223, Pubbl. d. Soc. Ital., Pap. Gr. e Lat. IV. 410. 8 ff.

All these quotations show that such sentences as ἐφοβούντο γὰρ were reasonably possible in conversation or letters as the end of a paragraph; they do nothing to support his contention that they were possible in popular narrative, whether written or oral. Mark himself offers no parallel for such an ending to a pericope. His endings follow the usual "form" of popular

⁶ Professor C. H. Dodd pointed out to me the resemblance of these openings to that of Herodotus. Apart from the initial clause, the introduction of Mark's story with an appeal to prophecy followed by the story itself is no more abrupt than Lucian's abrupt opening of his *Life of Demonax* with an ethical reflection beginning *ξελλεν ἀρα*.

⁷ *Locality and Doctrine in the Gospels*, 11 ff.

stories which demands that you must round off your incident properly, leaving nothing to the imagination. His normal endings for a narrative pericope may be classified as: (1) a summary of the actions of Jesus (1, 34, 39; 4, 33; 6, 5, etc.); (2) a summary of the actions of others concerned (1, 13 (where the ministry of the angels explain the possibility of the 40 days fast; we must avoid supposing that Mark left anything to the readers' imagination by reading into him the problems raised by the other narratives of the Temptation) 3, 6; 5, 20; 10, 52); (3) the effect of the miracles of Jesus on the crowd⁸ (1, 45; 2, 12; 6, 53 ff.; 7, 36, etc.); (4) a saying of Jesus (in 1, 8 of the Baptist); (5) an action of Jesus or other actors which naturally concludes the story (1, 20, 31; 5, 43 (all these prove the genuineness of the miracle), 6, 29 (a notable case since it follows the general aim of completing a story by adding what happened to the body of the Baptist after his head had been given to Herodias!), 6, 43 ff.; 7, 30; 10, 16; 11, 11; etc.). The Passion narrative is more of a coherent whole than the rest of the Gospel and it is not easy to classify its section-endings or even to be sure where particular sections are intended to conclude. But it may be noted that the incident of 14, 51 f., which appears to leave everything to the reader's imagination, really does nothing of the kind; it is simply meant to show the intensity of the panic of the followers of Jesus by informing us that the young man had so little regard for the Jewish sense of propriety that he actually fled away stark naked. In no case do we have an ending to a Marcan pericope which is intended to leave anything to our imagination. We are sometimes puzzled, but that is because we read Mark with the synoptic problem in our minds, or else with certain Christological presuppositions, whether orthodox or liberal, which are not always easy to harmonize with the Marcan picture. In no case are the actions or words as recorded intended to leave anything to our imagination, and the same may be said of the other two synoptic Gospels.

⁸ For the "acclamations" cf. Dibelius, *From Tradition to Gospel*, 58. The wonder and admiration excited by a miracle is a regular theme of Hellenistic wonder stories; but it is thoroughly Semitic; it is peculiarly prominent in the story of the widow's son at Nain (Lk. 7, 14 ff.), the nadir of Greek in the synoptic Gospels.

The fact is made more remarkable by a comparison with the Fourth Gospel. Here we have a writer who, at any rate in his Passion-narrative, deliberately makes use of what may be called the "dramatic aposiopesis" as a means of stimulating our imagination. In John 13, 30; 18, 27 and 40; 19, 22 we have an amazingly effective use of short sentences which convey a wealth of suggestion by what they leave unsaid. In the case of 18, 27 we can contrast Mark and John at a point where they overlap, and where John may have been using Mark. It is undeniable that John's ending of the story of the denial of St. Peter, "And immediately the cock crew," is from the point of view of literary technique far more effective than Mark's laborious account of how St. Peter remembered the prophecy of his denial by Jesus and went out and wept. But this is not due to any primitive or popular element in the Fourth Gospel; it is a conscious piece of literary artifice as against the desire of popular literature to round off every story with an appropriate ending.

Yet even the Fourth Gospel does not dare to end in this way. From the point of view of the literary technique we are considering, "Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed" would have been a far more effective ending for a Gospel addressed to churches all of whose members "had not seen and yet had believed" than the quite conventional summary of v 30 f. (For this see below.) But the abrupt ending which was possible for a paragraph was, it appears, impossible for the end of a book, even for this writer; in the same way the later addition c. 21, has its own formal conclusion. Thus it is extremely unlikely that Mark could intentionally have ended even a pericope in this way, since he does so nowhere else. To suppose that by some chance he ended his last pericope in this way involves a difficulty which is quite insuperable when we compare the supposed ending with narrative-conclusions in Jewish and Hellenistic literature in general.

It must of course be admitted that we have no exact parallel to the Gospels insofar as we have no story of a death followed by a resurrection attested by those who claimed to be eyewitnesses. But the other Gospels show that it was easy to

round off the story with a suitable conclusion and so to comply with what appears to be the invariable practice of ancient biographies or quasi-biographical narratives. The conclusions of such writings fall into fairly well-marked types which may be classified as follows: ⁹

(1) The burial of the hero, or of the last hero mentioned. For this compare Genesis 23. 19, 25. 10, 35. 29, 50. 13 and 26 (which is perhaps a formal transition, leaving the story to be completed later), Joshua, 1 Samuel, the twelve Testaments of the XII Patriarchs, the Apocalypse of Moses,¹⁰ which makes good the failure of Genesis to finish off the story of Adam, the Testament of Abraham, the Testament of Job, Plutarch's lives of Valerius Publicola, Fabius Maximus, Timoleon and Sulla. With these may be classed 4 Esdras and 2 Enoch which have to add the hero's translation to heaven, and the Acts of John in which the hero arranges his own burial. It may be noted that Josephus supplies the deficiencies of the Old Testament, by describing the happy death and burial of Ezra and Nehemiah.¹¹ This form of ending seems a natural derivation from the court-chronicle as represented most obviously in the stories of the kings of Israel and Judah. Clearly Mark could not end in this way; the Marcan tradition was too strong to allow Luke to end his Gospel thus and start Acts with the Resurrection.

(2) Where the crisis takes place during the early life of the hero, we can end with a summary description of his subsequent prosperity; here we have a variation of the folk-tale ending "and they all lived happily ever afterwards." This appears in

⁹ Naturally these conclusions are not mutually exclusive; the same "life" may contain at the close an account of the hero's death and burial and a formal conclusion. In what follows I treat the last item, whatever it may be, as the "conclusion." In some cases it is not easy to decide whether we have a closing panegyric or a formal ending, as in John 21, 25.

¹⁰ Accepting the view of Wells in Charles Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament that the doxologies are an addition. For the doxology as an ending see below.

¹¹ Antt. XI. 158 and 183. My thanks are due to Professor F. S. Marsh for drawing my attention to this point. It is worth noting that Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana concludes with the various stories of his death of which Damis his source gave no account. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο χρὴ παραλείφθαι, δὲ γάρ που τὸν λόγον ἔχειν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πέρας. Philostratus has no doubt that a life must end with the death and cultus of his hero.

Job (formally completed by a notice of his death), Esther, the narrative part of Daniel (6, 28), Tobit, Judith, Susanna and 3 Maccabees. Philo's life of Joseph (*De Josepho*) is an elaborate specimen of this type; another is provided by the Acts of Thomas (unless it be classed elsewhere in virtue of its formal doxology) while a very brief specimen is the ending of the Acts of Paul and Thecla (formally carried on to Thecla's death). Judaism seems to have a special predilection for happy endings of this type as appears from the artificial happy endings which relieve the gloom of the closing chapters of 2 Kings, 2 Chronicles and Jeremiah. It may be noted that even the Mishnah has a trick of ending its less cheerful tracts by inserting an entirely irrelevant cheerful passage (Yoma, Taanith, Sotah, Kiddushin, Makkoth and the final tract). We might include 2 Enoch in this class, if we prefer it, since it adds to Enoch's translation an account of its joyful celebration by his sons.¹² In the Gospels Matthew and Luke fall into this class, giving us a summary picture of the Church in the enjoyment of victory.

We may note as a variation of this the type in which the narrative is concerned with the events of a single day. This has its literary prototype in the Symposium of Plato; after the banquet Socrates goes out to the Lyceum as usual and returns home in the evening; the irrelevant details bring the story to a suitable stopping-place. This seems to be the inspiration of the end of the *Poimandres* and the *Asclepius* books of the *Corpus Hermeticum*; the story deals with a day in a man's life and ends with a day; the type has no parallel in the New Testament, but it is not without importance as evidence for the dislike of an abrupt conclusion in this type of literature. Justin's *Dial. c. Tryph.* is a Christian specimen.

(3) Another form is the summary panegyric, which closes the story with an account of the hero's virtues or greatness. This may be no more than a single sentence, as in its literary prototype, the *Phaedo* of Plato; other specimens are *Deuteronomy*, Philo's *De Abrahamo* and Lucian's *Life of Demonax*, where it follows an account of his burial. Lucian also uses an

¹² Or is it inspired by the pagan lives which add to the hero's death and burial an account of the cultus paid to him after his death?

adroit variation of it in his account of Alexander of Abonoteichos by winding up with a panegyric of Epicurus as the exact opposite of his villain. This type provides the conclusion for Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Plutarch's lives of Agis, Galba, and C. Gracchus (here in the form of a panegyric on Sempronia). It is put into the form of a portentous apostrophe by Tacitus at the end of the *Agricola*. Tacitus is of all the ancient writers the one whom we might expect to venture on a dramatic aposiopesis, and he gave himself a very effective opportunity in the words which precede his final panegyric *ut nesciret a bono patre non scribi heredem nisi malum principem*, but it appears that he regarded such an ending as impossible. In the New Testament this type has provided the original ending of the Fourth Gospel (John 20, 30); it is perhaps worth noticing that this conclusion has better literary precedent than any other type.

(4) The book may be ended by a formal concluding sentence, which may be no more than "So much then for so-and-so." It may be elaborated according to taste but adds nothing and does not even summarize the preceding narrative as the panegyric does. Properly such a form is more suited to mark a transition from one subject to another, and it is frequently so employed (e.g. Thucydides, Books 2, 3, 4, and 7, as divided in later times, and most books of Josephus both in *Antt.* and *B. J.*) Both these works and his autobiography which is a pendant to *Antt.* have slightly elaborated formal conclusions, as does the *Symposium* of Xenophon; it may be noted that his *Memorabilia* fall into well-marked sections which normally end in this way (1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7; 2, 10; 3, 2, and 9; 4, 1, 2, 3, and 4). Otherwise they end with a saying of Socrates. Another specimen is Lucian's *True History*, Book I. In Jewish literature we may compare Numbers, Philo's life of Moses and in Flaccus (unless the allusion to the care of providence for the Jews entitles it to be regarded as a specimen of class (3) above), 2 Maccabees (a very elaborate specimen), 2 Baruch and Jubilees. The closing "Remember me, O my God, for good" of Nehemiah perhaps entitles it to be regarded as falling in this class. In this class also may be placed the doxological ending borrowed by Jewish and Christian literature from the homiletic

tradition of the synagogue; this appears in 4 Maccabees, the Book of James (Apocryphal New Testament, ed. M. R. James, p. 49), the Gospel of Thomas (*ibid.*, 65) and the bulk of the Christian apocrypha. The present ending of Mark (15. 20) may perhaps be included in this class in virtue of the final Amen; otherwise it falls with Matthew in class (2).

Apart from Mark we have a clear specimen of the slightly elaborated formal conclusion in John 21. 25. It is interesting to note that six of Plutarch's lives (Lycurgus, Aemilius Paullus, Philopoemen, Lysander, Cimon, and Tiberius Gracchus) have an ending of this kind. The fact is of importance as evidence for the Greek dislike of an abrupt ending, since his lives lead on to a comparison of his pairs of heroes, and therefore the end of each life is not strictly an end at all. This appears from his use of a formal transition ("having finished with A, let us go on to B") in two cases (Flaminius and Demetrius). Similar formal transitions appear in Josephus, *Antt.* XIII and XVI, Lucian's *True History*, Book II, where the further books promised in the transition do not exist; Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium*; Acts and the Shepherd of Hermas may perhaps be put in this class as ending with brief summaries which are obviously intended to leave the way open for a continuation (whether the continuation was ever written or not, is irrelevant; the ending of Acts seems clearly designed for this purpose). The end of the book of Judges is of this type; it is intended to summarize the period and to lead on to the kings.

(5) A book may end its story by clearing up the outstanding details for the sake of completeness, after the manner of the romantic novel. This is Plutarch's normal method of ending; it may include the cultus or other honors paid to the hero, the subsequent history of actors in the story or the history of his family (as in the case of Aratus), or other details of the same kind. There is no formal conclusion; the narrative stops because there is no more to be said, but there is no suggestion of a "dramatic aposiopesis" leaving anything to the imagination. Suetonius' lives of the Caesars are of this type, ending with such matters as the will of the hero (Augustus and Tiberius), the public reaction to his death (Caligula, Galba, Otho, and

Titus), portents which preceded the death which has already been described (Claudius, Vitellius [with an appended epigram], Vespasian and Domitian) or a clearing-up of subsequent events (Julius Caesar and Nero). In this class we may put the book of Ruth in virtue of its genealogy of David, unless we prefer to put it in class (2) with the genealogy added, but the genealogy is the real point. We have a similar clearing-up of the fate of the subsidiary characters in the Acts of Andrew (Apocr. N.T., 363; the Greek text printed by Lipsius,¹³ adds to the clearing-up a notice of the date of the martyrdom and a final doxology). The New Testament narratives leave no opening for such an ending; but it is perhaps not improbable that the multiplication of apocryphal Acts in the second century A.D. and later was due in no small measure to the natural curiosity of the Church as to the fate of the numerous characters who are left "in the air" by the canonical New Testament.

(6) A few cases may be noted in which the narrative ends with the completion of an action which is not the end of the whole story of the life of the hero or the relevant part of his career. Ezra is a notable case, though here the confusion of the texts makes it uncertain how the author intended his book to close. The canonical Ezra stops with the putting away of the foreign wives, but the abruptness is modified by the list of the names of those who did so; the Greek version adds the further story of Ezra from Nehemiah 8, 1-12, and so achieves a more happy ending, but it seems likely that the existing text is incomplete;¹⁴ various attempts have been made to produce a conventional ending, and Josephus' addition of a suitable ending to the careers of Ezra and Nehemiah has been noted above. Nehemiah itself ends with a completed action and the final prayer, as has been seen, may almost be regarded as a formal conclusion. Bel and the Dragon ends with the destruction of Daniel's enemies by the lions, but it is simply a variation of the story of the canonical Daniel (6, 1-24) and was presumably intended to lead up to the conclusion of the story of Daniel in 6, 28 which has already been noted. The most striking exception is Jonah,

¹³ *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha* II, 57.

¹⁴ Cf. Cook in *Charles Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, 1, 57.

which is bad popular literature, since it leaves the reader wondering (as I can remember wondering myself,) how the prophet escaped from the awkward position in which the story leaves him stranded. But it must be noted that Jonah is intended to drive home a lesson which is contained in God's final words to the prophet, which are so far from being incomplete that they even add the irrelevant "much cattle" to the population of Nineveh; and for a prophetic book the words of God are normally a sufficient ending. It may be noted that Josephus felt the lack of completeness, since he ignores the story of the gourd and records that Jonah foretold that Assyria would lose the empire of Asia. "And having announced this, he returned home." Josephus adds that he has told the story as he found it written, a curiously sceptical conclusion which he, or his source, uses on several occasions as a formal ending to a highly improbable story after the Hellenistic fashion.¹⁵ In any case this class cannot be adduced as a precedent for such an ending to a book as ἐφοβούντο γάρ would be in Mark, for the author has told all his story, so far as he regards it as important, and stops because he has no more to say, whereas Mark has only just reached what is after all the main point of his Gospel, and the real "happy ending" on which the whole faith of the Church depended.

It would appear then that the "dramatic aposiopesis" even as an ending to a section is only found in the New Testament in the Fourth Gospel, where it is a mark of elaborate literary technique, not of simple popular literature. But this Gospel does not dare to employ it for the conclusion of the whole book, and such a conclusion appears to be unparalleled in ancient literature of the narrative type, even when it is of the most sophisticated character.¹⁶ To suppose that Mark originally

¹⁵ Cf. Antt. 2, 347 ff., where he apologizes for the story of Exodus and the use of a similar formula as the close of Book 3, (322) to conclude the marvelous career of Moses; in 10, 281 we have a similar conclusion to the story of Daniel. For such sceptical conclusions cf. Pausanias 6. 26. 2, and for milder specimens 1. 2. 2, 2. 19. 8, 8. 2. 7.

¹⁶ For the purpose of completeness it may be noted that among the Hellenistic historians Polybius in his surviving books ends as a rule with a formal conclusion or transition, occasionally with a natural break in the story (a general going into winter-quarters). Diodorus Siculus invariably has a formal transition to the next book.

intended to end his Gospel in this way implies both that he was totally indifferent to the canons of popular story-telling,¹⁷ and that by a pure accident he happened to hit on a conclusion which suits the technique of a highly sophisticated type of modern literature. The odds against such a coincidence (even if we could for a moment entertain the idea that Mark was indifferent to canons which he observes scrupulously elsewhere in his Gospel) seem to me to be so enormous as not to be worth considering. In any case the supposition credits him with a degree of originality which would invalidate the whole method of form-criticism.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus varies between stopping at a good break in the story or winding up with a formal conclusion or transition.

¹⁷ Cf. Ed. Schwartz, *Fünf Vorträge über den Griechischen Roman* for the demand of the Hellenistic public for a happy ending for its novels. (I owe this reference to the joint kindness of Professor E. Fränkel and Dr. Daube of Caius College, Cambridge.) The *Scriptores Erotici* invariably provide a happy ending which is entirely explicit.

JEWISH RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN THE ADLER PAPYRI?

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I

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IT is my intention to discuss one question only, and not all the problems which are connected with the group of documents published as 'The Adler Papyri' by Mr. E. N. Adler together with his collaborators, the late Professor F. Ll. Griffith, Dr. F. M. Heichelheim and Mr. J. G. Tait in 1939.¹ This question is: Are there any traces of Jewish religious influence to be found in the Adler Archive, as has been suggested by the editors?

A few words will be sufficient to inform the reader of the contents of the documents. They are a complete archive of Greek and Demotic legal papyri written at Pathyris, a small town of Upper Egypt. They are dated between 134 and 89 B.C., and belonged to a certain Horus, son of Nechoutes, Πέρσης τῆς ἐπιγονῆς, and other members of his family. These contracts of loans, deeds of sale and of renunciation, oaths, marriage settlements, and the like, have much in common with other documents written at Pathyris during the same period. Horus, the central figure of the Archive, is called in some Demotic documents 'a man receiving pay' (μισθοφόρος or τακτόμισθος?), but after 93 B.C. 'a farmer, slave of Harsemtow' (p. 68). The late Professor Griffith, who edited the Demotic section of the Adler Papyri, suggested that 'in 93 B.C., or at the earliest 95, a change seems to have taken place in his status,' and that 'he had retired from active service in the army to spend his later years as a privileged cultivator of the sacred land of the god Harsemtow at Gebelên' (pp. 68-69).

¹ The Adler Papyri. The Greek texts edited by Elkan Nathan Adler, John Gavin Tait and Fritz M. Heichelheim. The Demotic texts by the late Professor Francis Llewellyn Griffith, LL.D., F.B.A. (1939). Oxford University Press.

Mr. Adler has pointed out in the paper read by him at the Fifth Congress of Papyrologists in 1937, that 'we have possibly a proof of Jewish influence on the customs of several persons mentioned in the Archive,'² a statement repeated in the Introduction to the Adler Papyri.³ As I am engaged in preparations for a *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum* with the purpose of collecting and discussing all Greek papyri and ostraca dealing with Jews, it seems important to me to reëxamine the facts on which this opinion of the editors of the Adler Papyri is based. The question what may be considered as 'Jewish' and what not in unliterary papyri from Hellenistic Egypt is fundamental to my work (as well as to that of other scholars) from the methodical point of view.

1. PERSIANS OF THE EPIGONE

Horus, son of Nechoutes, is referred to in the Adler Papyri as a 'Persian of the epigone.' This group of soldiers is described in the Introduction to the Adler Papyri, page 3 as follows:

These Persians of the Epigone were at the date of these documents the legal pseudo-national association of the families of all non-Hellenic mercenaries of the Ptolemaic kings, who were settled in Egypt, and who were descended not only from Persians of the Achaemenidic and Hellenistic time, but also from Egyptian soldiers, Graeco-Egyptian half-breeds, Arabs, negroes . . . , Nubians, Libyans and Jews. Jews of the epigone occur in many papyri from the third century onwards. Some papyri of the first century B.C., but after Actium, as well as of the first century A.D., give instance of Persians of the epigone descended from Jewish immigrants into Egypt.

These words might suggest that Jews formed a considerable part of the 'Persians.' It will be useful, therefore, to enumerate the documents which mention 'Persians' of Jewish origin. We find in 259 B.C. a 'Persian' of the cleruchia of Tubias in the Ammanitis called . . . *os 'Ανανίου* — no doubt a Jew, but perhaps never a resident of Egypt (P. Cairo Zen. 59 003). Another Jew *Πετῶς Χελκίου*, and his two sons, belonging to the Persians of the epigone, are mentioned in 59 A.D. as living in the *Σύρων κώμη* of the Heliopolites (P. Hamb. 2). Three Persians of the epigone from Alexandria, among them a 'Persian' woman called

² Actes du V^e Congrès de Papyrologie (1938), 14.

³ The Adler Papyri, p. 3 f.

Μάριον Ἰσάκιος, are mentioned in 10 B.C. (B.G.U. 1134), and a certain Sambathion, son of Dionysius, of Philadelphia in the Fayum, can likewise be regarded as a Jew (3 A.D.; S.B. 7341). In addition, we may assume that the Persians mentioned in P. Tebt. 815, frg. 5 (228–21 B.C.; Σίμων Ἀντιπάτρου) and in B.G.U. 1106 (13 B.C.; Θεοδότῃ Δωσιθέου) were Jews. No other instances of Jewish ‘Persians’ are known to me. On the other hand, when we peruse the long lists of Persians drawn up by Heichelheim,⁴ we find that the total number of Persians mentioned in Egyptian sources reaches approximately 530. The 10 or even fewer Jews who are known to have formed part of this immense number are so small a minority that the connection of Horus with the ‘Persians’ cannot serve as a proof for any connection between him and Judaism.

In my opinion, this link with the ‘Persians’ may lead us to a different conclusion disclosing influences from another region. The problem of the origin and position of the Persians is a complicated one, and cannot be discussed here; but we can take it as a certain fact that the Persians of the time of Horus were a pseudo-ethnic group which had nothing in common with the real Persians.⁵ The list of Persians of the late Ptolemaic period drawn up by Heichelheim, loc. cit., shows a considerable number of Egyptian names, especially among ‘Persians’ from Pathyris, as does the genealogical table of Horus given in the Introduction of the Adler Papyri.⁶ Neither the title of Horus Πέρσης τῆς ἐπιγονῆς nor its translation into Demotic ‘a Greek born in Egypt’⁷ should deceive us as to the true origin of this man. He and all his kinsmen more likely were Egyptians, a fact certainly not denied by the editors themselves, especially

⁴ F. M. Heichelheim, Die auswaertige Bevoelkerung im Ptolemaeerreich. Klio Beiheft 18 (1925), 100 f., and supplements of the same author in Archiv fuer Papyrusforschung IX (1928), 53 f. and XII (1936), 61 f.

⁵ For the many articles and books dealing with the Persians of the Epigone cf. the survey of F. M. Heichelheim, Bericht ueber griechische Staatskunde (1902–1932 (1934)), in Bursian’s Jahresbericht ueber die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Suppl. 250 (1935), 274 f., and in addition F. Zucker in Pauly-Wissowa, R. E. XIX, 910 f. art. ‘Persai’; F. Pringsheim, Journ. Eg. Arch. XXVI (1941), 146.

⁶ The Adler Papyri, p. 4.

⁷ For this double terminology cf. E. Bickermann, Arch. f. Pap. VIII (1926–27), 220 f.

as more than one half of the documents found in this Archive are written in Demotic. It might prove to be more conclusive to consider Egyptian influence on this Egyptian who lived in an Egyptian environment than to search for influences from more remote spheres.

2. LOANS WITHOUT INTEREST

Horus and his kinsmen 'receive and give loans only without interest'; this practice is said to be 'in complete accordance with Exodus XXII 24 and Deuteronomy XXIII 20' — 'We know from P. Tebt. 817, 818 that the Egyptian Jews of the second century B.C. observed the Biblical law in respect to loans.'⁸

Had the editors discussed the problem of loans without interest in more detail, they would certainly have told us that they were common in all classes of Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt. We know documents referring to this usage from Alexandria, from Upper Egypt and from other parts of the Nile country.⁹ On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the creditor of P. Tebt. 817, a money loan without interest, is a Jew, as is his debtor; but it should be noted that this is the only transaction of such a type known to have been performed by a Jew, while references to similar transactions among Greeks and Egyptians are common.¹⁰ If the editors wish to convince us that the contracts of P. Tebt. 817, 818 and P. Adler were written under the influence of the Bible, they must prove, in my opinion,

⁸ The Adler Papyri, p. 5.

⁹ I refer to P. Amh. 50; U. P. Z. II 190 (Upper Egypt); P. Hibeh 89 (Heracleopolites); P. Hamb. 2 (Heliopolites); B. G. U. 1053; 1055; 1146 (Alexandria). Cf. also F. Preisigke, *Woerterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden I* (1925) s.v. ἀτοκος. The abbreviations for editions of papyri which are used in this article are those of the *Archiv fuer Papyrusforschung*. Cf. for a complete list Cl. Præaux, *L'Economie Royale des Lagides* (1939), p. 571 f.

¹⁰ The editors refer to P. Tebt. 818 as to a loan without interest. Such a reference needs a commentary, since the loan of two talents 500 drachms of copper mentioned here is granted with the usual interest of 24%. It is recorded, indeed, in the contract that this loan is the amount which the debtor still owes to the creditor out of the sum of five talents which he received from a former agreement. The editors suppose, evidently, that this former loan was ἀτοκος and that the interest stipulated in the second agreement was regarded as a fine for the non-repayment of the former loan at the fixed time. It may be that they are right, especially as the parties to the contract are Jews; but it is nothing more than a suggestion.

that all the other papyrus contracts referring to loans without interest were written by Jews. I do not know the opinion of the editors on this question.¹¹ They seem to be trying to find Jews referred to in some documents of this type; but I doubt whether they will succeed in all cases. L. Vettius, *eques alae Vocontiorum*, of P. Hamb. 2 was hardly a Jew, and the *choachytes* of U.P.Z. 190 is not likely to have been influenced by the Bible.

Not only the question of a money-lender's nationality, but also the wording of the contracts should be discussed in this connection. Contracts like P. Tebt. 817, 818, P. Adler Gr. 6, 10, 15 and others are written in the usual style of Hellenistic loans, most of them registered and perhaps composed in the offices of the *agoranomi*. The loans were made for a fixed time, and fines were stipulated¹² in case of non-repayment on the day mentioned in the contract. In addition, the right of *πρᾶξις* was given to the creditor.¹³ It is an acknowledged fact that the formulae referring to fines and penalties of this kind in Ptolemaic papyri were Hellenistic, and not introduced into Ptolemaic Egypt by way of Jewish law. It seems to be more likely, under these circumstances, to consider the Jews in P. Tebt. 817 and 818 as acting in accordance with the common law of Hellenistic Egypt than to assume that they followed the Biblical tradition by choosing a type of loan without interest.¹⁴

A few additional remarks about loans without interest may be allowed me. As a rule heavy fines were agreed on in case of failure to repay punctually as provided in the contracts. In many cases the loans were granted for one or two months or other short periods, and the wording of many contracts sug-

¹¹ The editors (p. 5, note 3) refer to 'Jewish (?) loans' in B. G. U. IV (cf. M. Schnebel, *Aegyptus* XIII, 35 f.). The question mark after the word 'Jewish' shows that they themselves were not certain.

¹² Repayment of the *ἡμιόλιον* and 24% in P. Tebt. 817 and 818.

¹³ The Adler Papyri, p. 57 s.v. *πρᾶξις*.

¹⁴ The editors refer to an unprinted article of Professor Marmorstein, which deals with English Jewry of the Middle Ages. It appears that he found mediaeval analogies to the formulae of contracts which were used by Greeks in Hellenistic Egypt; yet how can these analogies solve our problem? Even if we assume that Jewish contracts of the Middle Ages were influenced by similar contracts of the Hellenistic period, it would only prove that Jews retained for a long time some features of Hellenistic judicial practice, but not that this practice itself was created or influenced by Jews.

gests that it was expected at the date of the agreement that the debt would not be repaid on the fixed day. If the loans were not repaid, new contracts were drawn up providing for payment of the fines stipulated in the original agreement, and the interest paid under the name of such a fine would be higher than the usual quota of between 4% and 24% allowed by the royal *diagramma*.¹⁵ We may therefore suppose that in many cases loans without interest were an artful method of extorting from the borrower more interest than was allowed by the laws of the country.¹⁶ Such behavior would hardly agree with the Bible. Certainly a Jew who was anxious to avoid the word 'interest' in the contract and yet had the intention of using his right as a creditor, could probably find many ways to evade the law; but that the Jews in Egypt abused the Bible so that they converted its moral commandment into its very opposite by draining the borrower of his money, seems to me to be quite incredible.

3. THE SEVENTH YEAR

In P. Adler dem. 20, according to the editors, 'the claim both to a certain loan and to its penalties is relinquished after seven years. It is remarkable that this transaction should conform so exactly with the law laid down in Deuteronomy XV 1-5, and Jewish influence seems to be at work here.'¹⁷

It would certainly be of great interest to find in Hellenistic Egypt traces of the Biblical injunction concerning the abolition of debts which was hardly practiced by Jews even in Palestine.¹⁸ P. Adler dem. 20 does not seem to be convincing

¹⁵ Cf. Cl. Préaux, *L'Economie Royale des Lagides* (1939), 282.

¹⁶ Cf. M. Schnebel, *Aegyptus XIII*, 40.

¹⁷ The Adler Papyri, p. 5.

¹⁸ In Nehemiah's time the Jewish people took an oath to observe the precept of the seventh year (Neh. X 32). We have, indeed, evidence from the Hellenistic age that the *shemita* of the soil (*šemiṭṭath 'adhāmāh*) was observed (I Macc. 6, 49; 6, 53; Joseph., Bell. Jud. I, 60; Ant. XII, 378; cf. also note 21). As to the *shemita* of debts (*šemiṭṭath kas-ṭm*), the question is more complicated. From Mishna Shebiith X 3 we may draw the conclusion, that theoretically the Biblical precept retained its power, but was practically abolished, because most money-lenders refused to grant loans on the approach of the seventh year. This state of affairs culminated at the time of Herod in the famous reform of Hillel, which enabled the money-lenders to persist in their rights

for such a surmise. This document was written in the year 21 of King Ptolemy Alexander and abolished the claims to a loan of wheat and barley contracted in the year 15 of the same king.¹⁹ The year 21 of Ptolemy Alexander is, indeed, the seventh year after the loan was made; but this has not necessarily a connection with the so-called Jewish *shemita*, because the *shemita* follows a circle of years established once and for all by the Bible.²⁰ Therefore, the date on which a contract was signed was of no avail for the year in which the claim had to be cancelled. If a loan was contracted as late as one year before the end of a sabbatical period, it had to be abolished in the following year.

It has not been noticed by the editors that the 21st year of Ptolemy Alexander, i.e. B.C. 93, was actually a year of the *shemita*,²¹ a fact which seems at first sight to strengthen the theory of Jewish influence in the Adler Papyri. But, on the other hand, P. Adler dem. 22, a similar deed of renunciation, is dated in B.C. 90 and not in a 'seventh' year, and the Greek deed of renunciation, P. Adler Gr. 2, is written in B.C. 124. Only P. Adler Gr. 14 of B.C. 100 is written in a 'seventh' year, but this text is a deed of renunciation which refers to a sale of land and not to debts. It is obvious, therefore, that the Adler documents dealing with abolition of debts were contracted in various years, some coinciding with the cycle of the *shemita*, others not, but without influence from the Biblical precept.

Finally, the Jewish *shemita* was not dependent on the creditor's consent. It was superfluous to write in a document 'I abolish the debt of X,' since the seventh year did that auto-

in spite of the Biblical law with the help of the so-called *Prosbol*. Cf. L. Blau, *Prosbol im Lichte der griechischen Papyri und der Rechtsgeschichte* (Festschrift zum 50 jaehrigen Bestehen der Franz-Joseph-Landesrabbinerschule in Budapest), pp. 96-151.

¹⁹ Cf. P. Adler Gr. 15.

²⁰ Deut. XV 9; Mishna Shebi'ith X 3.

²¹ We are able to compile a list of 'seventh' years during the Hellenistic age from the certain dates 164-3 B.C. (I Macc. 6, 49), 136-5 B.C. (Joseph., Bell. Jud. I, 60; Ant. XIII, 234) and 38-7 B.C. (Joseph., Ant. XIV, 475; XV, 7). Cf. E. Schuerer, *Geschichte des juedischen Volkes I* (3rd ed.), 35 f. The years 101-100 and 94-3 B.C. obviously belong in this list. Cf. also Th. Reinach, *Inscriptions de Toubas*. Rev. Et. Juives 85 (1928), 1 f.

matically.²² The mere fact that the demotic document contains such a declaration by the creditor proves that it was not written under Jewish influence.

4. THE USE OF THE WORD ἀδελφός

A further proof of the influence of Judaism on Horus and his family is found by the editors in the expression ἀδελφός, used as 'kinsman.' 'It might be worth noting in this connection that the expression ἀδελφός = "kinsman," only known up to now from the Septuagint and perhaps influenced by the Hebrew and Aramaic languages, may be used also in Adler Gr. 7 as it is in P. London Inv. 2850 (ined.).'²³

The following objections may be made to this statement. 'Ἀδελφός is used in the sense of 'kinsman' in P. Adler Gr. 7;²⁴ but in P. Adler Gr. 8, another deed of sale written seven days after the first text and mentioning the same persons, i.e. Θαῖβις Φίβιος Περσίνη and her guardian Παοὺς πρεσβύτερος Πατούτος τοῦ Φαγώνιος Πέρσης, Paous is called συγγενής of Thaibis, not ἀδελφός. We may draw from this the conclusion that the use of ἀδελφός as 'kinsman' was not constant in the family of Horus, but an occasional expression. In fact, we have no more than two instances of such use.

Furthermore, in P. Lond. Inv. 2850 col. II 15²⁵ the word is used for 'nephew,' and in P. Adler Gr. 7 for the 'son of the nephew.'²⁶ The Greek word for 'nephew' is ἀδελφιδούς, and a special Greek word for the 'son of the nephew' does not exist to my knowledge. In addition, it may be noted that Preisigke²⁷ was only able to collect references for ἀδελφιδούς from papyri of

²² It was, therefore, necessary to write the so-called Prosbol, i.e. a declaration annulling the effect of the *shemita*. Cf. Blau, op. cit., 110.

²³ Cf. The Adler Papyri, p. 6.

²⁴ The word ἀδελφός is restored here, but the editors rightly pointed out that P. Adler Gr. 7 is the ἀντίγραφον of a contract, the original of which, S. B. III 6645, is in our hands too. The word ἀδελφός occurs in this additional copy. Its restoration is, therefore, to be considered as absolutely certain.

²⁵ I am obliged to Dr. Heichelheim for sending me a copy of this papyrus. The text mentions Ταθῶτις Φίβιος Περσίνη, and her guardian and ἀδελφός Πανοβχοῦνις τοῦ Νεχούτου Πέρσης, who is actually her nephew.

²⁶ Cf. the genealogical table of The Adler Papyri, p. 4.

²⁷ Cf. Preisigke, op. cit., s.v.

the Roman period. It is quite possible, therefore, that the members of the family of Horus used the word ἀδελφός for ἀδελφιδούς, the last word being unknown to them.

It could be well understood, in my opinion, that a precept of the Bible might impress a pagan reader so much that he was willing to follow it; but it is very difficult to imagine that the special use of a single word in the Bible would lead to the same result. It may be added that the word ἀδελφός for 'kinsman' occurs in the Septuagint, as far as I can see, only eight times in Genesis and once in Job.²⁸ It seems, therefore, not to have been very common even among the Jews of Hellenistic Egypt.

5. HORUS AND THE *metuentes*

The editors are of the opinion that Horus, a 'servant of the god Harsemtow,' cannot have been a practising Jew, or a genuine proselyte, but they think that he was a *metuens* (σεβόμενος or φοβούμενος τὸν Θεόν).²⁹ This is based on the presumption that in all cases discussed above (loans without interest, *shemita*, etc.) traces of Jewish influence can be found. Since the editors' case, as shown above, is not sufficiently proved, it may be superfluous to discuss in particular their view upon the *metuentes*; but I would like to say that our sources concerning this enigmatic group of persons are not sufficient to enable us to form a clear opinion on them.

The *metuentes* were influenced by Judaism to a degree, but were not active members of Jewish communities. Nevertheless, we can be certain that the deity they worshipped was the Jewish God. It is, therefore, unlikely to suppose that a servant of the god Harsemtow would belong to the *metuentes*. We may agree, indeed, that certain members of the pagan society secretly worshipped the Jewish God without openly breaking with their pagan relations; but this conduct suits better the conditions of the Roman age, when the Jewish nation was treated throughout the Empire as a rebellious element owing to its frequent

²⁸ Gen. XIII 8; XIV 16; XXIV 15; 48; XXIX 12; 15; XXXI 23; 32; Job XLII 11. For ἀδελφή as 'kinswoman' cf. Gen. XXIV 6; Job XLII 11.

²⁹ The Adler Papyri, p. 6.

seditions. To be a Jew was dangerous, or at any rate unpleasant, during the Roman principate.

On the other hand, no such danger existed at the end of the second century B.C. under the tolerant rule of the later Ptolemies. The editors themselves record 'the political importance of Jewish generals and soldiers' ³⁰ at this period, facts which are well known. Why then should Horus hide his sympathies with Judaism and persist in his paganism? Perhaps, he was what we now call a 'syncretist'; but the full expansion of syncretistic cults belongs to the Roman age, and I cannot find any trace of religious influence in the Adler Papyri save that of Greek and Egyptian cults.

It is generally believed ³¹ that the main influence of Judaism on the *metuentes* consisted in their observing the Sabbath and the dietetic laws. This is quite natural, as the gentiles imitated first of all Jewish habits which were easy to recognize. When traces of such influence could be shown in the Adler Archive, I would not hesitate to call Horus a *metuens*.³² But the editors find evidence of Jewish influence in money-lending without interest and even in the observance of the *shemita*, principles which were not generally known, and could only be transmitted to Horus and his circle, if they read the Bible and were familiar with its interpretation. Furthermore, we must assume that they observed many more precepts, as it is unlikely that they picked out for themselves only the most severe economic regulations. In this case we should rather consider them as proselytes than as *metuentes*, a conclusion which the editors are prudent enough to reject.

There lived, indeed, many Jews in Ptolemaic Upper Egypt, and it is likely that the knowledge of the Bible was widespread among them from the earliest times; but we have no certain proof of Jewish influence upon Egyptians,³³ and we are not

³⁰ The Adler Papyri, p. 5.

³¹ Cf., for example, Schuerer, op. cit., III, 175; S. W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews (1937), I, 138 f.; III, 36.

³² It is possible that in the Roman age there was a considerable number of Egyptians observing the Sabbath. I shall discuss this problem in my *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum* mentioned above.

³³ On the contrary, we have proof from the papyri that Jewish inhabitants of Egypt

entitled to speak about 'the influence of Judaism in Egypt as shown in these and other texts.'³⁴ There were proselytes and *metuentes* in Egypt as everywhere, but we know neither their number nor the part they played in pagan society. Therefore, it seems preferable to me, not to base our interpretation of documents which, like the Adler Papyri, appear to deal with Egyptians upon our imperfect knowledge of Jewish proselytes and *metuentes*, but to look for explanation and analogies to texts which shed light on the life of Greeks and Egyptians in the Hellenistic age.

II

F. M. HEICHELHEIM

It is at Dr. Tscherikower's request and as an expression of my sincere thanks for an interesting correspondence with this fine scholar that I use this occasion to discuss some of the problems of the Adler Papyri more in detail than was possible in the main publication.³⁵ The question with which Dr. Tscherikower deals, that of Jewish religious influence in the Adler Archive and in a number of other Ptolemaic texts, is indeed one of considerable interest, as his survey will already have shown. I have learned

acted in their judicial and other affairs in accordance with the general injunctions of the laws of the country. Cf. P. Gurob 2 (a Jewish woman acting with the help of a guardian like an Egyptian or Greek woman). The great influence of the Egyptians upon the Jews can be recognized from the Edfu ostraca published by J. Manteuffel in *Fouilles Franco-Polonaises, Tell Edfou I* (1937), p. 145 f.; *II* (1938), p. 146 f., which reveal a considerable number of Egyptian names among the Jews in Edfu during the Roman age.

³⁴ Cf. The Adler Papyri, p. 6. Among these 'other texts' the editors refer to P. Cairo Zen. 59 762; P. Tebt. 817-18; O. G. I. S. 73-4 and Joseph., *Contra Apion*. II, 10, 123. All these texts are of doubtful meaning. P. Cairo Zen. 59 762 cannot prove Jewish influence upon Egyptians, because it is not certain whether the man who is mentioned in this text as observing the Sabbath was an Egyptian, a proselyte or a genuine Jew. For P. Tebt. 817-18 see above. The inscriptions O. G. I. S. 73-4 cannot be considered as Jewish religious propaganda, since the name of the Jewish god was not directly mentioned in them. As to the reference to Josephus, the words can be understood to concern Egypt as well as any other country where Jews and Greeks met together.

³⁵ The size of the volume had already been fixed, before I was asked to collaborate. This made it inevitable that the commentary on the texts had to omit a number of problems, and had to treat all questions as concisely as possible. The selection could not be completely satisfactory, but will, I sincerely hope, be considered as sufficient.

much from his elucidating discussion of a difficult problem; but I believe, nevertheless, that there are serious reasons which make it likely that Judaism and the Septuagint were not unknown to Horus and his family.

The meaning of ἀδελφός as 'kinsman' and that of ἀδελφή as 'kinswoman' can be easily understood, in the passages of the Septuagint to which Dr. Tscherikower refers, as translations of Hebrew 'āḥ and 'āḥôth; but such a meaning is completely alien to Greek, and there must be a reason why only two papyri connected with Horus, P. Adler Gr. 6 and P. Lond. Inv. 2850, use ἀδελφός similarly to the Septuagint. The fact that ἀδελφός was replaced by συγγενής in P. Adler Gr. 8 a few days after P. Adler Gr. 6, as Dr. Tscherikower rightly observes, might even be an indication that the use of ἀδελφός as 'kinsman' was so alien to the Greek of Ptolemaic Egypt that the parties to the contract had been advised by some officials to change the term.

In any case, it seems to be more likely, under these circumstances, that Horus had seen and read a text of the Septuagint, and especially of the Pentateuch, one of its earliest translated parts,³⁶ in the possession of one of his Jewish neighbors³⁷ in the small town of Pathyris. This is more probable than to believe with Dr. Tscherikower that ἀδελφός = 'kinsman' might be an inexplicable peculiarity of Hellenistic Greek unconnected with Semitic influence. A final decision will have a bearing on the translation of ἀδελφός in the Gospels. Dr. Tscherikower's interpretation of the facts removes serious philological objections against the well known patristic and Roman Catholic translation of ἀδελφός as 'kinsman' in the case of relatives of Christ.³⁸ This meaning of the term remains alien to the *Koine* according to my explanation, as most Protestant theologians have believed up to now; but this argument will have to be omitted or modified in future, if Dr. Tscherikower's point of view should be accepted.

As to the question of the *shemita*, Dr. Tscherikower has made

³⁶ Cf. C. H. Roberts, *Two Biblical Papyri in the John Rylands Library* (Manchester, 1936).

³⁷ P. Grenf. I 43 = W. Chr. II 57.

³⁸ Cf. for this question G. Kittel, *Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament* I (1933), 144-5 and A. Crampon, *La Sainte Bible* (1928), notes on p. 331.

a surprising discovery which only supports my case. He is able to prove that P. Adler dem. 20 is actually dated at the end of one of the circles of seven years after which all debts had to be cancelled according to Jewish law. In addition, P. Adler Gr. 14, a deed of renunciation referring to the possession of land, which similarly was contracted at the end of such a *shemita* circle, should be connected, in my opinion, with the *shemita* of the land which Dr. Tscherikower describes so elaborately. Without any doubt Jewish influence is here likely.

The fact that the renunciation had to be made by special deed does not establish an argument against it. The Biblical *shemita* precept did not become law automatically, if a pledge was involved,³⁹ as in P. Adler Gr. 15, and otherwise only in a Jewish state, but not in Ptolemaic Egypt. It could only be made legally valid in such a country by a special act in accordance with the law of the land. Also it is quite natural that the remaining two of the four deeds of renunciation in the Adler Archive were not concluded at the end of a sabbatical circle. Even the most pious Jewish business man had to perform such legal acts, if occasion arose, independently of the *shemita*, and there was no Biblical objection to it.

Whether Horus observed the Jewish Sabbath during one period of his life cannot be stated or refuted with certainty. A glance at the dates of his contracts shows that no contracts exist during his earlier years which had been concluded in the presence of Horus on a Saturday. Only three contracts dating from his old age make an exception, provided that they were not drawn up after sunset; but it should be noted that they were concluded after Horus had become 'servant of the god Harsetow,' a step which, in any case, must have weakened any Jewish influence of his earlier years.⁴⁰

³⁹ Baba Mezia 48b-49b (late first century A.D.).

⁴⁰ P. Adler Gr. 1 (Saturday, Horus is not a party to this contract nor concerned in any way); 2 (Saturday, the name of Horus is only restored and not at all certain); 3 (Friday); 4 (Saturday, the name of Horus is again only restored and rather uncertain); 5 (Wednesday); 7 (Monday); 8 (Monday); 9 (Monday and Wednesday); 10 (Tuesday); 11 (Thursday); 12 (Tuesday); 13 (Friday); 14 (Tuesday); 15 (Thursday); 16 (Tuesday); 17 (Saturday!); 18 (Tuesday); 21 (Wednesday); P. Adler dem. 2 (Tuesday and Wednesday); 4 (Tuesday); 6 (Sunday); 7 (Friday); 13 (Sunday); 15 (Sunday); 16

An additional argument for Jewish religious influence on Horus has been assumed from the fact that he and his kinsmen gave and received loans only without interest. The question whether this was due to Biblical influence or not cannot be solved from the Adler texts alone. Clearer evidence comes from similar papyrus documents in which such loans were actually concluded by professing Jews. I agree with Dr. Tscherikower, that the formulae in all published Ptolemaic and Roman papyri of this kind are exclusively Greek, and that many of such contracts were concluded by non-Jews; but there remains the question whether some Jews in Egypt did not choose this type of loan in preference to others, because its wording was not completely contradictory to the Biblical law, and gave them, at the same time, a chance to lend money in the Hellenistic manner. Actually there are quite a few creditors and debtors mentioned in such contracts who are, or probably are Jews.⁴¹

But more important are P. Tebt. 817 and 818, loans already discussed by Dr. Tscherikower. In P. Tebt. 817, and most likely in 818 as well, Jews contract loans without interest in accordance with the Biblical law, but introduce the postpayment of interest as a penalty when the conditions of the deed were not fulfilled. The formulae of the contracts are Hellenistic, but we are nevertheless able to prove that these texts do not represent individual acts of Jewish persons to assimilate themselves to Hellenistic economic conditions. Official Jewry considered similar transactions as not advisable, but legally

(Saturday!); 17 (Friday); 19 (Sunday); 20 (Thursday); 21 (Friday); 22 (Thursday); 23 (Wednesday); 24 (Wednesday); 25 (Saturday!). The day of the week should regularly be established for all texts which refer to Jews. I mention from my notes on this question B. G. U. 1272 (Thursday); 1282 (Sunday, Monday, Tuesday); P. Cairo Zen. 59 241 (Sunday); P. Enteuxeis 23 (Saturday!, Thursday, Wednesday); P. Gurob 2 = Chr. II 21 (Friday); P. Gurob 8 (Monday and Tuesday); P. Hamb. 108 (Sunday); P. S. I. 381 (Monday); P. Tebt. 800 (Tuesday, but registered by a pagan official on a Saturday); 817 (Monday); 818 (Friday); 820 (Friday). Cf. R. Schram, *Kalendario-graphische und chronologische Tafeln* (1908).

⁴¹ Cf. M. Schnebel, *Aegyptus XIII*, p. 35 f. and the texts mentioned in note 9, for which Dr. Tscherikower's remarks should also be considered. The registration of a loan with interest between Jews in P. Tebt. 815 Recto col. II 17 f. refers probably to a similar type of loan as the editors of *The Adler Papyri*, p. 5 (cf. also note 10 of this article) suggested for P. Tebt. 818.

permissible, at least up to about 120 A.D. Such indirect interest could not be reclaimed by court, as appears from Baba Mezia 61b, a passage which had to be reinterpreted by later Talmudic authorities who differed on this point. In addition, a number of passages in Mishna, Talmud and Midrash prove that there were possibilities to impose indirect interest in transactions between Jews, and even direct interest in quite exceptional cases.⁴²

Finally we possess documents from Angevin England published by Davis⁴³ and contracted in the middle of the 13th century A.D., which prove that postpayment of interest as a penalty was also allowed to the Jews of this time. I give these texts in a translation which the late Mr. H. Loewe of Queens' College, Cambridge, kindly contributed to this article together with the notes marked with his name:

Davis p. 72 No. 31. Norwich.

28th X 1253–27th X 1254.

In our presence, who are undersigned (literally 'who have sealed'), R. Jacob son of R. Eliab, made unqualified acknowledgment that he owes to R. Solomon, his brother, 60 shillings (*denarim*), of sterling coinage, to pay them at Easter (*Pascha*) of the year 38 of the reign of our lord king Henry (IIIrd), son of king John. And if the aforesaid time shall have passed without payment (having been made) to his brother R. Solomon, of the aforesaid debt, R. Jacob empowers him to regard the sixty shillings owing to him (as borrowed) by the agency of a non-Jew (literally 'to borrow the sixty *denarim* on his account through the mediation of a gentile')⁴⁴ at the rate of two pen-

⁴² Cf. Baba Mezia 61b: R. Eleazar (first quarter of IIInd century A.D.): 'Direct interest can be reclaimed by court, but not indirect interest. - - - - - This refers to prepaid and postpaid interest.' Of other passages referring to interest between Jews I mention Baba Mezia 61b; Baba Mezia V 6 and 71b–72b (reference to the habit of ascribing money to a gentile and lending it to an Israelite on interest indirectly; cf. for this habit also the documents from Angevin England mentioned above); Midrash Rabbah III Exodus XXXI 4; Baba Mezia V 5 and 69b–70a (allowed interest between Jews). Finally, Midrash Rabbah IV Leviticus III 1 ('Better is he who possesses ten gold pieces with which he does business and maintains himself than he who goes and borrows on interest') shows well the dissuasive, but not always completely negative attitude of the Talmudic period in the question of interest. Cf. also E. R. Goodenough, *The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt* (1929), p. 50; I. Heinemann, *Philos griechische und jüdische Bildung* (1932), p. 428 f.

⁴³ M. D. Davis, *Hebrew Deeds of English Jews before 1290*. Anglo-Jewish Hist. Exhib. Publ. II (1888).

⁴⁴ Cf. for the meaning of this passage H. Loewe, *Starrs and Jewish Charters Preserved in the British Museum II* (1932), p. 284 and the following extract from the unprinted lecture of A. Marmorstein, 'Some New Aspects of Jewish Religious Life and Literary Activity in Angevin England,' which the author, who was the first to point out a historical connection between P. Tebt. 817 and 818, and the above documents,

nies (שנ) in the pound (*litra*) for every week in which he delays payment after the aforesaid time, and under the aforesaid bond. And with regard to the interest which would accrue therefrom,⁴⁵ the aforesaid R. Jacob has mortgaged to his brother R. Solomon, the aforesaid, all his property whether it is pledged or not, which he has already acquired or which he may be destined to acquire in the future to the effect that all his property shall be mortgaged and pledged for the aforesaid bond, both for the principal and for the interest which shall accrue therefrom.⁴⁵

Also Mistress Gentil, the mother of the aforesaid R. Jacob and R. Solomon, came before us and acknowledged with a willing mind, in complete acknowledgment, that she undertook the fulfilment of the aforesaid bond by (giving as security) the large house which her husband, R. Eliab, left in Mancroft-street (Norwich), so that that also should be a mortgage and pledge and be hypothecated for the aforesaid bond, for the principal and for the interest which would accrue therefrom.⁴⁵

And in order to give effect to the aforesaid bond, and the interest which may accrue therefrom,⁴⁵ it shall be in the power of the aforesaid R. Solomon to summon the aforesaid R. Jacob either by the laws of Israel or by the laws of the Gentiles. And so long as this *shetar* remains in the hands of the aforesaid R. Solomon, it shall not be proper for his brother R. Jacob to say 'I have paid,' unless there be in his hands an acquittance (literally 'the breaking of the seal'), by fit witnesses. And what we have heard, we have undersigned, and also with regard to (the provision of) interest which is between the lines.⁴⁶ And all (shall) be correct and abiding.

(Witnesses): Hayyim, son of R. Obadiah, his rest be in Eden.

Samuel, son of the holy R. Moses, be his soul bound up in the bundle of life.

kindly allowed me to quote: 'A Jew, Jacob ben Eliab, borrowed 60 shillings from his brother Solomon and promised to repay the sum before Easter 1254. The loan was originally without interest; yet, in case of default within a calendar-year, Jacob, the debtor, undertakes to pay 2 pennies per month for each pound to a certain gentile, who steps in the place of the Jewish creditor. It is easy to imagine or visualise what happened. The debtor pays the interest weekly or monthly to the gentile, who after some deduction for his trouble delivers the rest to the Jewish creditor. Solomon ben Eliab was by no means the only one who availed himself of such a practice. There was another English Jew who evaded the Biblical injunction in exactly the same way. Rabbi Abraham, a man, as the title shows, of some scholarly attainment or distinction, the son of the holy martyr R. Asriel, and his brother-in-law Elijah ben Isaac agreed to a similar arrangement with each other. There can be no doubt about one or two facts to be noticed in all these and other transactions. First of all that these loans were originally contracted without interest. Secondly that the gentile was merely a man of straw, who was substituted for the Jewish creditor, and consequently a Jew paid interest to another Jew. This is a plain breach of the Mosaic law. Thirdly, it is quite unlikely that these and other Norman Jews would have acted thus without instruction or permission on the part of their authorised teachers or spiritual guides.'

⁴⁵ Both here and elsewhere the pronoun might refer to the person or the bond. In the former case 'devolve upon him' would be a better translation (H. Loewe).

⁴⁶ This provision is added to cover a supplementary clause written between the

Davis p. 72 No. 32. Norwich.

28th X 1253-27th X 1254 A.D.

In our presence, who are undersigned (literally 'who have sealed'), R. Abraham, son of the holy R. Azriel, has made unqualified acknowledgment that he owes to R. Elijah, the son of R. Isaac, the husband of his sister, 40 shillings (*denarim*) of sterling currency to be paid at Noel of the year 38 of the reign of our lord king Henry (IIIrd), son of king John. And if the aforesaid time be passed without payment of the aforesaid debt to the aforesaid R. Elijah, then the aforesaid R. Abraham has conceded permission to regard it as borrowed on his account by the agency of a non-Jew (literally 'to borrow the forty *denarim* on his account through the mediation of a gentile'),⁴⁴ at the rate of two pennies (פ) for a pound (*litra*) for every week in which payment is delayed, with his consent.

And with regard to the aforesaid bond, and with regard to the interest which would accrue therefrom,⁴⁵ the aforesaid R. Abraham has mortgaged to the aforesaid R. Elijah all his property whether it has been pledged or not, which he has already acquired or which he may be destined to acquire in future to the effect that all this property should be mortgaged and pledged for the aforesaid bond, and for the interest which shall accrue therefrom.⁴⁵

And the aforesaid R. Abraham has taken an oath holding an (holy) object that he will not seek any pretext, excuse or deception so as to preclude the aforesaid R. Elijah from (the fulfilment of) the aforesaid bond and from the interest which shall accrue therefrom⁴⁵ whether by the laws of Israel or by the laws of the Gentiles. And if, God forbid, he shall preclude him, then all the amount which the aforesaid R. Elijah shall expend to give effect to the aforesaid bond from the aforesaid R. Abraham, shall the aforesaid R. Abraham (re)pay to him on the security of all his property, but on this account he shall not be free from the aforesaid debt and from the interest which shall accrue therefrom.⁴⁵

And as long as this *shetar* shall be in the hand of the aforesaid R. Elijah, it shall not be proper (literally 'the aforesaid R. Abraham shall not be trustworthy to say') for the aforesaid R. Abraham to say 'I have paid,' unless by an acquittance (literally 'the breaking of the seal'), by fit witnesses. And we have acquired⁴⁷ (this deed) from R. Abraham the son of the holy R. Azriel, on behalf of R. Elijah son of R. Isaac with complete acquisition from now onwards,⁴⁸ according to all which is written and set out above, and by an instrument by which it is proper to acquire.

(Witnesses): Hayyim, son of R. Obadiah

Jacob, son of the Hasidh R. Joseph.

Davis p. 373 No. 207.

28th X 1248-27th X 1249 A.D.

We the undersigned (literally 'who have sealed') make unqualified acknowledgment that we owe to R. Berachiah, son of R. Ben- - -, to his rep-

lines. Any such insertion must be legitimated by a provision of this nature which must come before the words: 'And all,' etc., since nothing is valid which follows these words (H. Loewe).

⁴⁷ Cf. for this formula Loewe, Starrs II, p. 277 f. note 1263 A, B, C, G, K.

⁴⁸ Cf. for this expression Loewe, Starrs II, p. 283.

representative,⁴⁹ that he shall produce this *shetar* 8 days after St. Martin (11th November 1248 A.D.) in the year 33 of the reign (or our lord king Henry (IIIrd) son of king John)⁵⁰ - - - - -. Five marks (*zekukim*) - - - - - and if one of these periods shall have passed without R. Berachiah having been paid, of the moneys - - - - - with two pennies per week, every single week when the moneys is (sic) delayed after the time above designated - - - - - and it shall be our duty to pay both principal and interest within fifteen days of his summoning, without law and without protest - - - - - we have paid - - - - - and not to raise any objection of being free and quit, save only - - - - - from all which is in our hands - - - - - we have mortgaged and hypothecated to him, namely to R. Berachiah who is designated above, all our property whether it has been pledged or not - - - - - principal and interest, and we have no power - - - - - neither according to the laws of Israel nor according to the laws of the Gentiles and what we have acknowledged with our willing mind without duress we have undersigned (literally 'we have sealed') so as to be - - - - - .

There cannot be any doubt that there exists a direct historical connection between these mediaeval documents from Angevin England, P. Tebt. 817 (and most likely 818), and the above mentioned and many other passages in Mishna, Talmud and Midrash. Hellenistic usage of lending money appears to have been introduced into Jewish practice during the Hellenistic period to modify the Biblical laws against interest without actual transgression. Postpayment of interest as a penalty survived even in Jewish mediaeval documents.

Horus was, according to all this evidence, probably a gentile who liked to be in Jewish society, to read the Greek translation of the holy book of the Jews and to follow Jewish laws as long as these did not interfere too much with his material and social chances in life. His intention in doing so will have been to show special reverence to this god, as other gentiles did to other deities. I am not certain, after having read Dr. Tscherikower's well founded objections whether the title *metuens* given to Horus by the editors of the Adler Papyri would have been acknowledged by the rabbis of the Hellenistic age; but there existed groups of gentiles from the fourth century B.C. onwards who included a certain amount of Jewish practice and of reverence to the Jewish God in their religious life without acknowl-

⁴⁹ Cf. the references in Loewe, Starrs III, p. 502. It is probable, but not certain that the creditor, or the creditors, of this third contract were Jews.

⁵⁰ Henry II or Edward I cannot be restored (H. Loewe).

edging, after the manner of the *metuentes*, that the Jewish God was the only true deity.

The earliest evidence of this syncretistic type of religious practice is a much discussed coin ⁵¹ which represents the Jewish God as Zeus or Dionysus. It was most likely issued in a (coastal?) region of Palestine in the earlier part of the fourth century B.C., when Greek craftsmanship and Greek economic structure began to influence the life of Syria and Palestine. There followed, during the Hellenistic and Imperial age, the much discussed ⁵² expansion of the syncretistic cult of the Θεός Ὑψιστος throughout the whole Greek speaking world. To exclude uncertain indications, to which O. G. I. S. 73 and 74 indeed belong, there exist inscriptions from the Crimea, Thessalonica, Acmoneia in Asia Minor, from synagogues in Delos and Egypt proving that the Jewish God was included in this syncretistic cult which constituted a fragile bridge between Jewish monotheism and pagan polytheism. Similarly, coins of the town of Apamea in Phrygia ⁵³ show that the story of Noah's ark had become a pagan or semi-pagan myth of this region. Finally, there are a number of magical papyri, inscriptions and sculp-

⁵¹ Cf. with a full bibliography of the earlier discussion of this coin E. L. Sukenik, *The Oldest Coins of Judaea*, Journ. Palest. Orient. Soc. XIV (1934), 178 f.; id., *More About the Oldest Coins of Judaea*, Journ. Palest. Orient. Soc. XV (1935), 341 f.; S. A. Cook, *The Yahu Coin*, Z. f. A. T. W. XV (1938), 268 f.; A. B. Cook, *Zeus III* (1940), 1072. The coin to which we refer had on the Rev. either the inscription *YHW*, i.e. Jahveh or *YHD*. The latter reading is almost certain for a younger group of Palestinian coins, imitations of Athenian 'owls,' which were issued in the second half of the fourth century B.C.

Sukenik's interpretation of the reading *YHD* as an abbreviation of *Yehûdhâh*, i.e. 'Jehûd,' a name for Palestine during the Persian period, has been convincingly refuted by S. A. Cook and A. B. Cook. They rightly point out that only names of nations, persons or gods, but never names of regions occur on the many coins of this period. Apart from this, Sukenik's actual readings can only be refuted with palaeographic proofs which seem to be difficult to produce, at least for the younger group of coins. Could not *YHD* be understood as an abbreviated writing of *Yehûdîm* (Jews)?

⁵² Cf. C. H. Roberts — T. C. Skeat — A. D. Nock, *The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos*, The Harvard Theol. Review XXIX (1936), 39 f.; A. B. Cook, *Zeus II* (1925), 884, 887 f.; III (1940), 1162, where an acute and convincing discussion and interpretation of practically all the sources for this syncretistic cult can be found. Cf. also U. Wilcken, *Arch. f. Pap.* XII, 219 f., and for similar syncretistic cults Pauly-Wissowa, *R. E.* I A 1560 f. art. Sabbatistai; II A 2097 f. art. Sibyllen.

⁵³ Cf. with bibliography Pauly-Wissowa, *R. E.* II A 2102 and A. J. Reinach, *Noé Sanganou*. *Rev. Ét. Juives* 65 (1912), 161 f.; 66 (1913), 1 f.

tured objects ⁵⁴ which use Jewish formulae for an un-Jewish purpose. Horus, as I believe, belonged to the circles which produced these documents, and were everywhere open to Jewish society and propaganda, if they did not actually call for it, up to a certain limit of conversion. If I should be right in this, the Adler Papyri are documents which have a bearing on the religious history of the Hellenistic period which turned from polytheism to syncretism, and approached and passed over to monotheism.

⁵⁴ Cf. for this material A. B. Cook, *Zeus I* (1914), 293 f.; Th. Hopfner, *Griechisch-Aegyptischer Offenbarungszauber*, (*Stud. fuer Palaeogr. und Papyruskunde XXI and XXIII*, 1921-4), *Indices s.v. Jahweh*; E. G. Kagarow, *Griechische Fluchtafeln. Eus Supplementa IV* (1929), 63 f.

MYTHS AND RITUALS:¹ A GENERAL THEORY

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I

NINETEENTH century students strongly tended to study mythology apart from associated rituals (and indeed apart from the life of the people generally). Myths were held to be symbolic descriptions of phenomena of nature.² One prominent school, in fact, tried to find an astral basis for all mythic tales. Others, among whom Andrew Lang was prominent, saw in the myth a kind of primitive scientific theory. Mythology answered the insistent human HOW? and WHY? How and why was the world made? How and why were living creatures brought into being? Why, if there was life must there be death? To early psychoanalysts such as Abraham³ and Rank⁴ myths were "group phantasies," wish-fulfillments for a society strictly analogous to the dream and day-dream of individuals. Mythology for these psychoanalysts was also a symbolic structure par excellence, but the symbolism which required interpretation was primarily a sex symbolism which was postulated as universal and all-pervasive. Reik⁵ recognized a connection between rite and myth, and he, with Freud,⁶ verbally agreed to

¹ Based upon a paper read at the Symposium of the American Folklore Society at Chicago in December, 1939. My thanks are due to W. W. Hill, Florence Kluckhohn, A. H. Leighton, Arthur Nock, E. C. Parsons, and Alfred Tozzer for a critical reading and a number of suggestions, to Ruth Underhill and David Mandelbaum for supplying unpublished material on the Papago and Toda respectively.

² Professor Nock has called my attention to the fact that the naturalistic theory actually works very well for the Vedic material.

³ See Traum und Mythos (Vienna, 1909). Rank's final conclusion was that "myths are relics from the infantile mental life of the people, and dreams constitute the myths of the individual" (Selected Papers of Karl Abraham, London, 1927, p. 32). Cf. also Traum und Mythos, pp. 69, 71.

⁴ See Otto Rank, Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung (Vienna and Leipzig, 1919) and Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden (2nd edition, Leipzig and Vienna, 1922). Rank attempts to show that hero myths originate in the delusional structures of paranoiacs.

⁵ Theodor Reik, Das Ritual (Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich, 1928).

⁶ Cf. Freud's statement in his introduction to Reik, op. cit., p. 11.

Robertson Smith's proposition that mythology was mainly a description of ritual. To the psychoanalysts, however, mythology was essentially (so far as what they did with it is concerned) societal phantasy material which reflected impulse repression.⁷ There was no attempt to discover the practical function of mythology in the daily behaviors of the members of a society⁸ nor to demonstrate specific interactions of mythology and ceremonials. The interest was in supposedly pan-human symbolic meanings, not in the relation of a given myth or part of a myth to particular cultural forms or specific social situations.⁹

To some extent the answer to the whole question of the relationship between myth and ceremony depends, of course, upon how wide or how restricted a sense one gives to "mythology." In ordinary usage the Oedipus tale is a "myth," but only some Freudians believe that this is merely the description of a ritual! The famous stories of the Republic are certainly called "*μῦθος*," and while a few scholars¹⁰ believe that Plato in some cases had reference to the Orphic and/or Eleusinian mysteries there is certainly not a shred of evidence that all of Plato's immortal "myths" are "descriptions of rituals." To be sure, one may justifiably narrow the problem by saying that in a technical sense these are "legends," and by insisting that "myths" be rigorously distinguished from "legends," "fairy-

⁷ Many psychoanalysts today consider myths simply "a form of collective day-dreaming." I have heard a prominent psychoanalyst say "Creation myths are for culture what early memories (true or fictitious) are to the individual."

⁸ This has been done, even by anthropologists, only quite recently. Boas, as early as 1916 (*Tsimshian Mythology*, Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual Report for 1909-10, vol. 31, pp. 29-1037), did attempt to show how the origin of all folklore must be sought in imaginings based upon the ordinary social life of the society in question. But in this (as in his later publication on the Kwakiutl) he showed how mythology reflected social organization — *not* how mythology preserved social equilibrium or symbolized social organization.

⁹ Dr. Benedict in her *Zuni Mythology* (New York, 1935) follows a form of explanation which draws heavily from psychoanalytic interpretations. Thus, (p. xix) in discussing the compensatory functions of mythology, she speaks of "folkloristic day-dreaming." But her treatment lacks the most objectionable features of the older psychoanalytic contributions because she does not deal in universalistic, *pan*-symbolic "meanings" but rather orients her whole presentation to the richly documented Zuni materials and to the specific context of Zuni culture.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g., R. H. S. Crossman, *Plato Today* (London, 1937), p. 88.

tales," and "folk-tales." If, however, one agrees that "myth" has Durkheim's connotation of the "sacred" as opposed to the "profane" the line is still sometimes hard to draw in concrete cases. What of "creation myths"? In some cases (as at Zuni) these are indeed recited¹¹ during ritual performances (with variations for various ceremonies). In other cases, even though they may be recited in a "ritual" attitude, they do not enter into any ceremonial. Nevertheless, they definitely retain the flavor of "the sacred." Moreover, there are (as again at Zuni) exoteric and esoteric forms of the same myth. Among the Navaho many of the older men who are not ceremonial practitioners know that part of a myth which tells of the exploits of the hero or heroes but not the portion which prescribes the ritual details of the chant. Granting that there are sometimes both secular and sacred versions of the same tale and that other difficulties obtrude themselves in particular cases, it still seems possible to use the connotation of the sacred as that which differentiates "myth" from the rest of folklore.¹² At least, such a distinction appears workable to a rough first approximation and will be followed throughout this paper.

But defining "myth" strictly as "sacred tale" does not

¹¹ There are Aranda, Fijian, and Winnebago chants which are almost purely recitals of an origin myth.

¹² This covers the differentia which is often suggested: namely, that myth is distinguished from legend or folktale by the circumstance that some (or perhaps most) of the actors in a myth must be supernatural beings — not simply human beings of however great a legendary stature. There are, of course, other distinctions which could — for other purposes — profitably be entered into. Thus, Professor Nock has suggested to me that there are differences of some consequence between an oral mythology and a written theology. "A true myth," he says, "never takes form with an eye to the pen or to the printed page."

These refinements are undoubtedly interesting and important, but they do not seem directly relevant to the issues dealt with in this paper. Here only the major contrast of sacred and profane appears crucial. Any segregation of myth from folktale, legend, fairytale, etc. which rests upon hair-splitting or upon special premises must be avoided. Thus Roheim's recent stimulating discussion (*Myth and Folk-Tale*, American Imago, vol. 2, 1941, pp. 266-279) is acceptable only insofar as one grants the major postulates of orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis. Roheim says: "A folktale is a narrative with a happy end, a myth is a tragedy; a god must die before he can be truly divine" (p. 276). "In the folk tale we relate how we overcome the anxiety connected with the 'bad parents' and grew up, in myth we confess that only death can end the tragic ambivalence of human nature. Eros triumphs in the folk-tale, Thanatos in the myth" (p. 279).

carry with it by implication a warrant for considering mythology purely as a description of correlative rituals. Rose¹³ quite correctly says "among myths there are many whose connection with any rite is a thing to be proved, not assumed." What is needed is a detailed comparative analysis of actual associations. Generally speaking, we do seem to find rich ritualism and a rich mythology together. But there are cases (like the Toda)¹⁴ where an extensive ceremonialism does not appear to have its equally extensive mythological counterpart and instances (like classical Greece) where a ramified mythology appears to have existed more or less independent of a comparatively meagre rite-system.¹⁵ For example, in spite of the many myths relating to Ares the rituals connected with Ares seem to have been few in number and highly localized in time and space.¹⁶ The early Romans, on the other hand, seemed to get along very well without mythology. The poverty of the ritual which accompanies the extremely complex mythology of the Mohave is well known.¹⁷ Kroeber indeed says "Public ceremonies or rituals as they occur among almost all native Americans cannot be said to be practised by the Mohave."¹⁸

¹³ H. J. Rose, Review of "The Labyrinth" (Man, vol. 36, 1936, no. 87, p. 69).

¹⁴ Dr. Mandelbaum writes me: "For the Todas do not have complex myths; myth episodes which take hours and days in the telling among Kotas, are told by Todas in less than three minutes." Cf. M. Emeneau, The Songs of the Todas (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 77, 1937, pp. 543-560); "... the art of story-telling is almost non-existent. In fact, imaginative story-telling hardly exists and the stories of traditional events in the life of the tribe do not seem to be popular. . . . Some of the songs are based on legendary stories, but even in the case of these some of my informants knew the songs without knowing the stories" (p. 543).

¹⁵ I am thinking here of public (non-cultist) mythology and of official and public ritual. Orphic ritual may have been more closely connected to the complicated Orphic myth. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, Who Were the Orphics? (Scientia, vol. 67, 1937, pp. 110-121), esp. pp. 119-120.

¹⁶ Cf. L. R. Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States, vol. IV (Oxford, 1909), pp. 396-407.

¹⁷ A. L. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California (Washington, 1925), p. 660.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 755. The Mohave are, of course, also a classic case where myths, at least according to cultural theory, are dreamed. But even though we recognize the cultural patterning of the "dreaming" this in no sense justifies the inference that the myths are derived from the meagre rituals. Indeed Kroeber points out (p. 770) that some myths are not sung to — i.e. are not even ritualized to the extent of being connected with song recitals.

The Bushmen likewise had many myths and very little ritual. On the other hand, one can point to examples like the Central Eskimo, where every detail of the Sedna myth has its ritual analogue in confessional, other rites, or hunting tabus, or, for contrast, to the American Indian tribes (especially some Californian ones) where the creation myth is never enacted in ceremonial form. In different sectors of one culture, the Papago, all of these possibilities are represented. Some myths are never ceremonially enacted. Some ceremonies emphasize content foreign to the myth. Other ceremonies consisting only of songs have some vague place in the mythological world; between these and the myths "there is a certain tenuous connection which may be a rationalization made for the sake of unity. . . ." ¹⁹

The anthropology of the past generation has tended to recoil sharply from any sort of generalized interpretation. Obsessed with the complexity of the historical experience of all peoples, anthropologists have (perhaps over-much) eschewed the inference of regularities of psychological reaction which would transcend the facts of diffusion and of contacts of groups. Emphasis has been laid upon the distribution of myths and upon the mythological patterning which prevailed in different cultures and culture areas. Study of these distributions has led to a generalization of another order which is the converse of the hypothesis of most nineteenth century classical scholars ²⁰ that a ritual was an enactment of a myth. In the words of Boas: ²¹ "The uniformity of many such rituals over large areas and the diversity of mythological explanations show clearly that the ritual itself is the stimulus for the origin of the myth. . . . The ritual existed, and the tale originated from the desire to account for it."

¹⁹ Personal communication from Dr. Ruth Underhill.

²⁰ Certain contemporary classical scholars take a point of view which is very similar to that adopted in this paper. Thus H. J. Rose (*Modern Methods in Classical Mythology*, St. Andrews, 1930, p. 12) says " . . . I postulate . . . a reciprocal influence of myth and ceremony. . . ." Cf. also L. R. Farnell, *The Value and the Methods of Mythologic Study* (London, 1919), p. 11, " . . . occasionally myth is the prior fact that generates a certain ritual, as for instance the offering of horses to St. George in Silesia was suggested by the myth of St. George the horseman. . . ."

²¹ F. Boas and others, *General Anthropology* (New York, 1938), p. 617.

While this suggestion of the primacy of ritual over myth is probably a valid statistical induction and a proper statement of the modal tendency of our evidence, it is, it seems to me, as objectionably a simple unitary explanation (if pressed too far) as the generally rejected nineteenth century views. Thus we find Hocart²² recently asking: "If there are myths that give rise to ritual where do these myths come from?" A number of instances will shortly be presented in which the evidence is unequivocal that myths did give rise to ritual. May I only remark here that — if we view the matter objectively — the Christian Mass, as interpreted by Christians, is a clear illustration of a ritual based upon a sacred story. Surely, in any case, Hocart's question can be answered very simply: from a dream or a waking phantasy or a personal habit system of some individual in the society. The basic psychological mechanisms involved would seem not dissimilar to those whereby individuals in our own (and other) cultures construct private rituals²³ or carry out private divination²⁴ — e.g. counting and guessing before the clock strikes, trying to get to a given point (a traffic light, for instance) before something else happens. As DuBois²⁵ has suggested, "the explanation may be that personal rituals have been taken over and socialized by the group." These "personal rituals" could have their genesis in idiosyncratic habit²⁶ formations (similar to those of obsessional neurotics in our culture) or in dreams or reveries. Mrs. Seligman²⁷ has con-

²² A. M. Hocart, *Myth and Ritual* (Man, vol. 36, no. 230), p. 167.

²³ Cf. A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities* (New York, 1934), pp. 242-267, esp. p. 260 ff.

²⁴ R. R. Willoughby gives good examples and discussions of these culturally unformalized divinatory practices. See *Magic and Cognate Phenomena: An Hypothesis* (In: *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, Carl Murchison, ed., Worcester, Mass., 1935, pp. 461-520), pp. 480-482.

²⁵ C. DuBois, *Some Anthropological Perspectives on Psychoanalysis* (Psychoanalytic Review, vol. 24, 1937, pp. 246-264), p. 254.

²⁶ In other words, in terms of patterns of behavior which are distinctive of an individual, not as a representative of a particular cultural tradition, but as a differentiated biological organism who — either because of inherited constitutional differences or because of accidents of the conditioning process — behaves differently in major respects from most individuals of the same age, sex, and status acculturated in the same culture.

²⁷ B. Z. Seligman, *The Part of the Unconscious in Social Heritage* (In: *Essays Presented to C. G. Seligman*, London, 1934, pp. 307-319).

vincingly suggested that spontaneous personal dissociation is a frequent mechanism for rite innovations. The literature is replete with instances of persons "dreaming" that supernaturals summoned them, conducted them on travels or adventures, and finally admonished them thereafter to carry out certain rites (often symbolically repetitive of the adventures).

Moreover, there are a number of well documented actual cases where historical persons, in the memory of other historical persons, actually instituted new rituals. The ritual innovations of the American Indian Ghost Dance cult²⁸ and other nativistic cults of the New World²⁹ provide striking illustration. In these cases the dreams or phantasies — told by the innovators before the ceremonial was ever actualized in deeds — became an important part of traditionally accepted rite-myths. Lincoln³⁰ has presented plausible evidence that dreams are the source of "new" rituals. Morgan,³¹ on the basis of Navaho material, says:

... delusions and dreams ... are so vivid and carry such conviction that any attempt to reason about them afterwards on the basis of conscious sense impressions is unavailing. Such experiences deeply condition the individual, sometimes so deeply that if the experience is at variance with a tribal or neighborhood belief, the individual will retain his own variation. There can be no doubt that this is a very significant means of modifying a culture.

Van Gennep³² asserts that persons went to dream in the sanctuary at Epidaurus as a source for new rites in the cult of Asclepius. To obtain ceremony through dream is, of course, itself a pattern, a proper traditional way of obtaining a ceremony or power. I do not know of any cases of a society where dreaming

²⁸ I am, of course, well aware that the rites of the Ghost Dance were not by any means identical in all tribes. But in spite of wide variations under the influence of pre-existent ideal and behavioral patterns *certain* new ritual practices which must be connected with the visions of the founder may be found in almost every tribe.

²⁹ See A. F. Chamberlain, *New Religions among the North American Indians* (*Journal of Religious Psychology*, 1913, vol. 6, pp. 1-49).

³⁰ J. S. Lincoln, *The Dream in Primitive Cultures* (Baltimore, 1935).

³¹ William Morgan, *Human Wolves Among the Navaho* (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No. 11, 1936), p. 40. Dr. Henry A. Murray of the Harvard Psychological Clinic informs me that there is clinical evidence that an individual can be conditioned (in the technical psychological sense) by a dream.

³² A. van Gennep, *La Formation des Légendes* (Paris, 1910), p. 255. The peyote cult is, of course, an outstanding case where dreams determine variation in ritual.

is generally in disrepute, as at Zuni, and where ceremony has yet demonstrably originated through dream. But where dreaming is accepted as revelation it must not be assumed that the content (or even, entirely, the structure) of a new myth and its derived ceremony will be altogether determined by pre-existent cultural forms. As Lowie³³ has remarked, "That they themselves (dreams) in part reflect the regnant folklore offers no ultimate explanation." Anthropologists must be wary of what Korzybski calls "self-reflexive systems" — here, specifically, the covert premise that "culture alone determines culture."

The structure of new cultural forms (whether myths or rituals) will undoubtedly be conditioned by the pre-existent cultural matrix. But the rise of new cultural forms will almost always be determined by factors external to that culture: pressure from other societies, biological events such as epidemics, or changes in the physical environment. Barber³⁴ has recently shown how the Ghost Dance and the Peyote Cult represent alternative responses of various American Indian tribes to the deprivation resultant upon the encroachment of whites. The Ghost Dance was an adaptive response under the earlier external conditions, but under later conditions the Peyote Cult was the more adaptive response, and the Ghost Dance suffered what the stimulus-response psychologists would call "extinction through non-reward." At any rate the Ghost Dance became extinct in some tribes; in others it has perhaps suffered only partial extinction.

There are always individuals in every society who have their private rituals; there are always individuals who dream and who have compensatory phantasies. In the normal course of things these are simply deviant behaviors which are ridiculed or ignored by most members of the society. Perhaps indeed one should not speak of them as "deviant" — they are "deviant" only as carried to extremes by a relatively small number of individuals, for everyone probably has some

³³ R. H. Lowie, *The History of Ethnological Theory* (N. Y., 1937), p. 264.

³⁴ Bernard Barber, *Acculturation and Messianic Movements* (*American Sociological Review*, vol. 6, 1941, pp. 663-670); *A Socio-Cultural Interpretation of the Peyote Cult* (*American Anthropologist*, 1941, vol. 43, pp. 673-676).

private rituals and compensatory phantasies. When, however, changed conditions happen to make a particular type of obsessive behavior or a special sort of phantasy generally congenial, the private ritual is then socialized by the group, the phantasy of the individual becomes the myth of his society. Indeed there is evidence³⁵ that when pressures are peculiarly strong and peculiarly general, a considerable number of different individuals may almost simultaneously develop substantially identical phantasies which then become widely current.

Whether belief (myth) or behavior (ritual) changes first will depend, again, both upon cultural tradition and upon external circumstances. Taking a very broad view of the matter, it does seem that behavioral patterns more frequently alter first. In a rapidly changing culture such as our own many ideal patterns are as much as a generation behind the corresponding behavioral patterns. There is evidence that certain ideal patterns (for example, those defining the status of women) are slowly being altered to harmonize with, to act as rationalizations for, the behavioral actualities. On the other hand, the case of Nazi Germany is an excellent illustration of the ideal patterns ("the myth") being provided from above almost whole cloth and of the state, through various organizations, exerting all its force to make the behavioral patterns conform to the standards of conduct laid down in the Nazi mythology.

Some cultures and sub-cultures are relatively indifferent to belief, others to behavior. The dominant practice of the Christian Church, throughout long periods of its history, was to give an emphasis to belief which is most unusual as seen from a cross-cultural perspective. In general, the crucial test as to whether or not one was a Christian was the willingness to avow belief in certain dogmas.³⁶ The term "believer" was almost synonymous with "Christian." It is very possibly because of this cultural screen that until this century most European scholars selected the myth as primary.

³⁵ See Marie Bonaparte, Princess of Greece, *The Myth of the Corpse in the Car* (The American Imago, 1941, vol. 2, pp. 105-127).

³⁶ Ruth Benedict in the Article "Myth" (Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. IX, 1933) makes a similar point but distorts it by the implication that belief in a certain *cosmology* was the single crucial test of Christianity.

II

To a considerable degree, the whole question of the primacy of ceremonial or mythology is as meaningless as all questions of "the hen or the egg" form. What is really important, as Malinowski has so brilliantly shown, is the intricate interdependence of myth (which is one form of ideology) with ritual and many other forms of behavior. I am quite aware that I have little to add conceptually to Malinowski's discussion in "The Myth in Primitive Psychology."³⁷ There he examines myths not as *curiosa* taken out of their total context but as living, vitally important elements in the day to day lives of his Trobrianders, interwoven with every other abstracted type of activity. From this point of view one sees the fallacy of all unilateral explanations. One also sees the aspect of truth in all (or nearly all) of them. There are features which seem to be explanatory of natural phenomena.³⁸ There are features which reveal the peculiar forms of wish fulfillments characteristic of the culture in question (including the expression of the culturally disallowed but unconsciously wanted). There *are* myths which are intimately related to rituals, which may be descriptive of them, but there are other myths which stand apart. If these others are descriptive of rituals at all, they are, as Durkheim (followed by Radcliffe-Brown and others) suggested, descriptions of rituals of the social organization. That is, they are symbolic representations of the dominant configurations³⁹ of the particular culture. Myths, then, may ex-

³⁷ London, 1926.

³⁸ Radcliffe-Brown's explanation, though useful, strikes me as too narrow in that it seems to deny to nonliterate man *all* bare curiosity and any free play of fancy, undetermined by societal necessities. He says (Andaman Islanders, Cambridge, England, 1933, pp. 380-381): "Natural phenomena such as the alternation of day and night, the changes of the moon, the procession of the seasons, and variations of the weather, have important effects on the welfare of the society . . . a process of bringing within the circle of the social life those aspects of nature that are of importance to the well-being of the society."

³⁹ "Configuration" is here used as a technical term referring to a structural regularity of the covert culture. In other words, a configuration is a principle which structures widely varying contexts of culture content but of which the culture carriers are minimally aware. By "configuration" I mean something fairly similar to what some authors have meant by "latent culture pattern" as distinguished from "manifest

press not only the latent content of rituals but of other culturally organized behaviors. Malinowski is surely in error when he writes⁴⁰ "... myth ... is not symbolic. ..." Durkheim and Mauss⁴¹ have pointed out how various non-literate groups (notably the Zuni and certain tribes of southeastern Australia) embrace nature within the schema of their social organization through myths which classify natural phenomena precisely according to the principles that prevail in the social organization. Warner⁴² has further developed this type of interpretation.

Boas,⁴³ with his usual caution, is sceptical of all attempts to find a systematic interpretation of mythology. But, while we can agree with him when he writes "... mythological narratives and mythological concepts should not be equalized; for social, psychological, and historical conditions affect both in different ways,"⁴⁴ the need for scrupulous inquiry into historical and other determinants must not be perverted to justify a repudiation of all attempts to deal with the symbolic processes of the all-important covert culture. At all events, the factual record is perfectly straightforward in one respect: neither myth nor ritual can be postulated as "primary."

This is the important point in our discussion at this juncture, and it is unfortunate that Hooke and his associates in their otherwise very illuminating contributions to the study of the relations between myth and ritual in the Near East have emphasized only one aspect of the system of interdependences which Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown have shown to exist. When Hooke⁴⁵ points out that myths are constantly used to

culture pattern." The concept is also closely akin to what Sumner and Keller call a cultural "ethos." For a fuller discussion of "configuration" and "covert culture" see Clyde Kluckhohn, *Patterning as Exemplified in Navaho Culture* (In: *Language, Culture, and Personality*, L. Spier, ed., Menasha, 1941, pp. 109-131), esp. pp. 109, 124-129.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., p. 19.

⁴¹ De Quelques formes primitives de classification (*L'Année Sociologique*, vol. 6).

⁴² W. L. Warner, *A Black Civilization* (New York, 1937), esp. pp. 371-411.

⁴³ See especially F. Boas, Review of G. W. Locher, "The Serpent in Kwakiutl Religion: a Study in Primitive Culture" (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1933, pp. 1182-1186; reprinted in *Race, Language, and Culture*, New York, 1940, pp. 446-450).

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 450.

⁴⁵ S. H. Hooke, *The Origins of Early Semitic Ritual* (London, 1938), pp. 2, 3, 8. See also *Myth and Ritual* (London, 1933).

justify rituals this observation is quite congruent with the observed facts in many cultures. Indeed all of these data may be used toward a still wider induction: man, as a symbol-using animal, appears to feel the need not only to act but almost equally to give verbal or other symbolic "reasons" for his acts.⁴⁶ Hooke⁴⁷ rightly speaks of "the vital significance of the myth as something that works," but when he continues "and that dies apart from its ritual" he seems to imply that myths cannot exist apart from rituals and this, as has been shown, is contrary to documented cases. No, the central theorem has been expressed much more adequately by Radcliffe-Brown:⁴⁸ "In the case of both ritual and myth the sentiments expressed are those that are essential to the existence of the society." This theorem can be regarded as having been well established in a general way, but we still lack detailed observations on change in myths as correlated with changes in ritual and changes in a culture generally.⁴⁹ Navaho material gives certain hints that when a culture as a whole changes rapidly its myths are also substantially and quickly altered.

In sum, the facts do not permit any universal generalizations as to ritual being the "cause" of myth or vice versa. Their relationship is rather that of intricate mutual interdependence, differently structured in different cultures and probably at different times in the same culture. As Benedict⁵⁰ has pointed out, there is great variation in the extent to which mythology conditions the religious complex — "the small role of myth in Africa and its much greater importance in religion in parts of North America." Both myth and ritual satisfy the needs of a

⁴⁶ This statement is not to be interpreted as credence in "the aetiological myth" if by this one means that a myth "satisfies curiosity." We are not justified, I believe, in *completely* excluding the aetiological (in this sense) motive in every case, but Whitehead's statement (*Religion in the Making*, New York, 1926) probably conforms to a rough induction: "Thus the myth not only explains but reinforces the hidden purpose of the ritual which is emotion" (p. 25).

⁴⁷ S. H. Hooke (ed.) *The Labyrinth* (New York, 1935), p. ix.

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 405.

⁴⁹ The best documentation of the fact that myths are constantly undergoing revision is probably to be found in various writings of Boas. See, for example, *Race, Language, and Culture* (New York, 1940), pp. 397-525, *passim*.

⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 180.

society and the relative place of one or the other will depend upon the particular needs (conscious and unconscious) of the individuals in a particular society at a particular time. This principle covers the observed data which show that rituals are borrowed without their myths,⁵¹ and myths without any accompanying ritual. A ritual may be reinforced by a myth (or vice versa) in the donor culture but satisfy the carriers of the recipient culture simply as a form of activity (or be rationalized by a quite different myth which better meets their emotional needs).⁵² In short, the only uniformity which can be posited is that there is a strong tendency for some sort of inter-relationship between myth and ceremony and that this inter-relationship is dependent upon what appears, so far as present information goes, to be an invariant function of both myth and ritual: the gratification (most often in the negative form of anxiety reduction) of a large proportion of the individuals in a society.

If Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown (and their followers) turned the searchlight of their interpretations as illuminatingly upon specific human animals and their impulses as upon cultural and social abstractions, it might be possible to take their work as providing a fairly complete and adequate general theory of myth and ritual. With Malinowski's notion of myth as "an active force" which is intimately related to almost every other

⁵¹ This appears to be the Papago case. (Underhill, personal communication.)

⁵² There are many striking and highly specific parallels between Navaho and Hopi ceremonial practices. For example, the mechanical equipment used in connection with the Sun's House phase of the Navaho Shooting Way chants has so much in common with similar gadgets used in Hopi ceremonials that one can hardly fail to posit a connection. Dr. Parsons has documented the intimate resemblances between the Male Shooting Way chant and Hopi Flute and Snake-Antelope ceremonies (*A Pre-Spanish Record of Hopi Ceremonies*; *American Anthropologist*, 1940, vol. 42, pp. 541-543, fn. 4, p. 541). The best guess at present would be that the Hopi was the donor culture, but the direction of diffusion is immaterial here: the significant point is that the supporting myths in the cases concerned show little likeness. For instance, Dr. Parsons regards the Flute Ceremony as a dramatization of the Hopi emergence myth, but the comparable ritual acts in Navaho culture are linked to chantway legends of the usual Holy Way pattern and not to the emergence story. In contrast, the White Mountain Apache seem to have borrowed *both* Snake myth and ritual from the Hopi. See E. C. Parsons, *Pueblo Indian Religion* (Chicago, 1939), p. 1060 and G. Goodwin, *Myths and Tales of the White Mountain Apache* (*Memoirs of the American Folklore Society*, vol. 33, New York, 1939), p. vii.

aspect of a culture we can only agree. When he writes:⁵³ "Myth is a constant by-product of living faith which is in need of miracles; of sociological status, which demands precedent; of moral rule which requires sanction," we can only applaud. To the French sociologists, to Radcliffe-Brown, and to Warner we are indebted for the clear formulation of the symbolic principle. Those realms of behavior and of experience which man finds beyond rational and technological control he feels are capable of manipulation through symbols.⁵⁴ Both myth and ritual are symbolical procedures and are most closely tied together by this, as well as by other, facts. The myth is a system of word symbols, whereas ritual is a system of object and act symbols. Both are symbolic processes for dealing with the same type of situation in the same affective mode.

But the French sociologists, Radcliffe-Brown, and — to a lesser extent — Malinowski are so interested in formulating the relations between conceptual elements that they tend to lose sight of the concrete human organisms. The "functionalists" do usually start with a description of some particular ritualistic behaviors. Not only, however, do the historical origins of this particular behavioral complex fail to interest them. Equally, the motivations and rewards which persons feel are lost sight of in the preoccupation with the contributions which the rituals make to the social system. Thus a sense of the specific detail is lost and we are soon talking about myth in general and ritual in general. From the "functionalist" point of view specific details are about as arbitrary as the phonemes of a language are with respect to "the content" of what is communicated by speech. Hence, as Dollard⁵⁵ says, "What one sees from the cultural angle is a drama of life much like a puppet show in which 'culture' is pulling the strings from behind the scenes." The realization that we are really dealing with "animals struggling in real dilemmas" is lacking.

From this angle, some recent psychoanalytic interpretations

⁵³ Op. cit., p. 92.

⁵⁴ That is, forms of behavior whose value or meaning is assigned by human beings — not inherent in the intrinsic properties of the words or acts.

⁵⁵ John Dollard, *Culture, Society, Impulse, and Socialization* (*American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 45, pp. 50-64), p. 52.

of myth and ritual seem preferable. We may regard as unconvincing Roheim's ⁵⁶ attempts to treat myths as historical documents which link human phylogenetic and ontogenetic development, as we may justly feel that many psychoanalytic discussions of the latent content of mythology are extravagant and undisciplined. Casey's ⁵⁷ summary of the psychoanalytic view of religion "... ritual is a sublimated compulsion; dogma and myth are sublimated obsessions" may well strike us as an over-simplified, over-neat generalization, but at least our attention is drawn to the connection between cultural forms and impulse-motivated organisms. And Kardiner's ⁵⁸ relatively sober and controlled treatment does "point at individuals, at bodies, and at a rich and turbulent biological life" — even though that life is admittedly conditioned by social heredity: social organization, culturally defined symbolic systems, and the like.

In a later section of this paper, we shall return to the problem of how myths and rituals reinforce the behavior of individuals. But first let us test the generalities which have been propounded thus far by concrete data from a single culture, the Navaho.⁵⁹

III

The Navaho certainly have sacred tales which, as yet at all events, are not used to justify associated rituals. A striking case, and one where the tale has a clear function as expressing a sentiment "essential to the existence of the society," is known from different parts of the Navaho country.⁶⁰ The tales

⁵⁶ G. Roheim, *The Riddle of the Sphinx* (London, 1934), esp. pp. 173-174.

⁵⁷ R. P. Casey, *The Psychoanalytic Study of Religion* (*Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 33, 1938, pp. 437-453), p. 449.

⁵⁸ A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York, 1939), esp. pp. 182-194, 268-270.

⁵⁹ Some Navaho material has, of course, already been presented. See pp. 47, 51, 57, *supra*.

⁶⁰ E. L. Hewett (*The Chaco Canyon and Its Monuments*, Albuquerque, 1936, p. 139) records the dissemination of this tale among the Chaco Canyon Navaho. Drs. A. and D. Leighton and I have obtained independent evidence that the same story was told, and believed by many, among the Ramah Navaho (two hundred odd miles away) at the same time. Those who believed the tale carried out ceremonials but not new ceremonials. Rather the old ceremonials (especially Blessing Way rites) were carried out in unusual frequency. In 1936 in the Huerfano country a young woman reported that she had been visited by White Shell Woman who had been given instructions for

differ in detail but all have these structural elements in common: one of "the Holy People" visits one or more Navahos to warn them of an impending catastrophe (a flood or the like) which will destroy the whites — but believing Navahos will be saved if they retire to the top of a mountain or some other sanctuary. It is surely not without meaning that these tales became current at about the time that the Navahos were first feeling intensive and sustained pressure (they were not just prisoners of war as in the Fort Sumner epoch) from the agents of our culture.⁶¹

Father Berard Haile ⁶² has recently published evidence that

Blessing Ways to be held — but with special additional procedures. These rites were widely carried out in the northeastern portion of the Navaho area. (See article by Will Evans in the Farmington, N. M., Times Hustler, under date-line of February 21, 1937.) Also in 1936 a woman in the Farmington region claimed to have been visited by Banded Rock Boy (one of the Holy People) and a similar story spread over the Reservation. A famous singer, Left-handed, refused to credit the tale and many Navahos attributed his death (which occurred soon thereafter) to his disbelief. See Mesa Verde Notes, March, 1937, vol. 7, pp. 16-19. F. Gilmor (Windsinger, New York, 1930) has used a story of the same pattern, obtained from the Navaho of the Kayenta, Arizona region as a central episode in a novel.

⁶¹ Jane Harrison (Themis, Cambridge, England, 1912) says: "It is this collective sanction and solemn purpose that differentiate the myth alike from the historical narrative and the mere *conte* or fairy-tale . . ." (p. 330), and many agreeing with her will doubtless assert that my argument here is invalid because these tales though unquestionably having "solemn purpose" lack "collective sanction." Some would also contend that since living persons claim to have seen the supernatural beings these stories must be called "tales" or, at any rate, not "myths." I see these points and, since I wish to avoid a purely verbal quarrel, I would agree, so far as present data go, that Navaho myths (in the narrow sense) are uniformly associated with ritual behaviors. Actually, *the* myth which most Navaho call their most sacred (the emergence story) is associated with rites only in a manner which is, from certain points of view, tenuous. The emergence myth is not held to be the basis for any single ceremonial, nor is it used to justify any very considerable portion of ceremonial practice. The emergence myth (or some part of it) *is* often prefaced to the chantway legend proper. In any case, I must insist (granting always that the line between secular and sacred folk literature must not be drawn too sharply) that the stories dealt with above are not part of the "profane" folklore of the Navaho in the sense in which the Coyote tales, for example, are. The origin legends of the various clans are certainly not secular literature, but I imagine that a purist would maintain that we must call these "legends" as lacking "solemn purpose" (in Harrison's sense). Nevertheless I repeat that "myths" in the broad sense of "sacred tale" are, among the Navaho, found quite dissociated from ritual.

⁶² A Note on the Navaho Visionary (American Anthropologist, vol. 42, 1940, p. 359). This contains still another reference to the flood motif.

Navaho ceremonials may originate in dreams or visions rather than being invariably post hoc justifications for existent ritual practices. A practitioner called "son of the late Black Goat" instituted a new ceremonial "which he had learned in a dream while sleeping in a cave." Various informants assured Father Berard that chantway legends originated in the "visions" of individuals.⁶³ We have, then, Navaho data for (a) the existence of myths without associated rituals, (b) the origin of both legends and rituals in dreams or visions.

It is true that all ceremonial practice among the Navaho is, in cultural theory, justified by an accompanying myth. One may say with Dr. Parsons⁶⁴ on the Pueblos: "Whatever the original relationship between myth and ceremony, once made, the myth supports the ceremony or ceremonial office and may suggest ritual increments." One must in the same breath, however, call attention to the fact that myth also supports accepted ways of secular behavior. As Dr. Hill⁶⁵ has pointed out, "Women are required to sit with their legs under them and to one side, men with their legs crossed in front of them, because it is said that in the beginning Changing Woman and the Monster Slayer sat in these positions." Let this one example suffice for the many which could easily be given.⁶⁶ The general point is that in both sacred and secular spheres myths give some fixity to the ideal patterns of cultures where this is not attained by the printed word. The existence of rituals has a similar effect.

⁶³ The assertion that ceremonials sometimes have their genesis in dreams and the like does not imply that this, any more than that between myth and ritual, is a one-way relationship. One can by no means dispose of the matter simply by saying "dreams cause myths and myths cause ceremonies." William Morgan (*Navaho Dreams*, *American Anthropologist*, vol. 34, 1932, pp. 390-406), who was also convinced that some Navaho myths derive from dreams (p. 395), has pointed out the other aspect of the interdependence: "... myths ... influence dreams; and these dreams, in turn, help to maintain the efficacy of the ceremonies. ... Repetitive dreams do much to strengthen the traditional beliefs concerning dreams" (p. 400).

⁶⁴ E. C. Parsons, *Pueblo Indian Religion* (Chicago, 1939), p. 968, footnote.

⁶⁵ W. W. Hill, *The Agricultural and Hunting Methods of the Navaho Indians* (New Haven, 1938), p. 179.

⁶⁶ Dr. Parsons has suggested (personal communication) an analogue from our own culture: "It was argued that because Eve was made from Adam's rib women should not have the vote."

Although I cannot agree with Wissler⁶⁷ that "the primary function" of rituals is "to perpetuate exact knowledge and to secure precision in their application," there can be no doubt that both myths and rituals are important agencies in the transmission of a culture and that they act as brakes upon the speed of culture change.

Returning to the connections between myth and rite among the Navaho, one cannot do better than begin by quoting some sentences from Washington Matthews:⁶⁸ "In some cases a Navajo rite has only one myth pertaining to it. In other cases it has many myths. The relation of the myth to the ceremony is variable. Sometimes it explains nearly everything in the ceremony and gives an account of all the important acts from beginning to end, in the order in which they occur; at other times it describes the work in a less systematic manner. . . . Some of the myths seem to tell only of the way in which rites, already established with other tribes, were introduced among the Navajos. . . . The rite-myth never explains all of the symbolism of the rite, although it may account for all the important acts. A primitive and underlying symbolism which probably existed previous to the establishment of the rite, remains unexplained by the myth, as though its existence were taken as a matter of course, and required no explanation."

To these observations one may add the fact that knowledge of the myth is in no way prerequisite to carrying out of a chant. Knowledge does give the singer or curer prestige and ability to expect higher fees, and disparaging remarks are often heard to the effect "Oh, he doesn't know the story," or "He doesn't know the story very well yet." And yet treatment by a practitioner ignorant of the myth⁶⁹ is regarded as efficacious.

⁶⁷ C. Wissler, *The Function of Primitive Ritualistic Ceremonies* (Popular Science Monthly, vol. 87, pp. 200-204), p. 203.

⁶⁸ Washington Matthews, *Some Illustrations of the Connection between Myth and Ceremony* (International Congress of Anthropology, Memoirs, Chicago, 1894, pp. 246-251), p. 246.

⁶⁹ How much a practitioner knows of both legend and ceremonial depends upon the demands he made upon his instructor during his apprenticeship. The instructor is not supposed to prompt his pupil. Many practitioners are satisfied with quite mechanical performances, and there is no doubt that much information (both legendary and ritualistic) is being lost at present owing to the fact that apprentices do not question their instructors more than superficially.

Navahos are often a little cynical about the variation in the myths. If someone observes that one singer did not carry out a procedure exactly as did another (of perhaps greater repute) it will often be said "Well, he says *his* story is different." Different forms of a rite-myth tend to prevail in different areas of the Navaho country and in different localities. Here the significance of the "personality" of various singers may sometimes be detected in the rise of variations. The transvestite ⁷⁰ "Left-handed" who died a few years ago enjoyed a tremendous reputation as a singer. There is some evidence ⁷¹ that he restructured a number of myths as he told them to his apprentices in a way which tended to make the hermaphrodite be?gočidí a kind of supreme Navaho deity — a position which he perhaps never held in the general tradition up to that point.⁷² I have heard other Navaho singers say that sandpaintings and other ceremonial acts and procedures were slightly revised to accord with this tenet. If this be true, we have here another clear case of myth-before-ritual.

Instances of the reverse sort are also well documented. From a number of informants accounts have been independently obtained of the creation (less than a hundred years ago) of a new rite: Enemy Monster Blessing Way. All the information agreed that the ritual procedures had been devised by one man who collated parts of two previously existent ceremonials and added a few bits from his own fancy. And three informants independently volunteered the observation "He didn't have any story. But after a while he and his son and another fellow made one up."⁷³ This is corroborated by the fact that none of Father Berard's numerous versions of the Blessing Way myth mention an Enemy Monster form.⁷⁴

Besides these notes on the relations between myth and rite

⁷⁰ A transvestite is an individual who assumes the garb of the other sex. Transvestites are often, but apparently not always, homosexuals.

⁷¹ See W. W. Hill, The Status of the Hermaphrodite and Transvestite in Navaho Culture (American Anthropologist, vol. 37, 1935, pp. 273-280), p. 279.

⁷² For a hint, however, that be?gočidí was so considered at an earlier time, see W. Matthews, Navaho Legends (New York, 1897), p. 226, footnote 78.

⁷³ Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn and Leland C. Wyman, An Introduction to Navaho Chant Practice (Memoir 53, American Anthropological Association, 1940), pp. 186-187.

⁷⁴ Personal communication.

I should like to record my impression of another function of myth — one which ranges from simple entertainment to “intellectual edification.” Myth among the Navaho not only acts as a justification, a rationale for ritual behavior and as a moral reinforcement for other customary behaviors. It also plays a role not dissimilar to that of literature (especially sacred literature) in many literate cultures. Navahos have a keen expectation of the long recitals of myths (or portions of them) around the fire on winter nights.⁷⁵ Myths have all the charm of the familiar. Their very familiarity increases their efficacy, for, in a certain broad and loose sense, the function of both myths and rituals is “the discharge of the emotion of individuals in socially accepted channels.” And Hocart⁷⁶ acutely observes: “Emotion is assisted by the repetition of words that have acquired a strong emotional coloring, and this coloring again is intensified by repetition.” Myths are expective, repetitive dramatizations — their role is similar to that of books in cultures which have few books. They have the (to us) scarcely understandable meaningfulness which the tragedies had for the Greek populace. As Matthew Arnold said of these, “their significance appeared inexhaustible.”

IV

The inadequacy of any simplistic statement of the relationship between myth and ritual has been established. It has likewise been maintained that the most adequate generalization will not be cast in terms of the primacy of one or the other of these cultural forms but rather in terms of the general tendency

⁷⁵ Why may the myths be recited only in winter? In Navaho feeling today this prohibition is linked in a wider configuration of forbidden activities. There is also, as usual, an historical and distributional problem, for this same prohibition is apparently widely distributed in North America. For example, it is found among the Berens River Salteaux (see A. I. Hallowell, *Fear and Anxiety as Cultural and Individual Variables* in a *Primitive Society*, *Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 9, 1938, pp. 25-48, p. 31) and among the Iroquois (Dr. William Fenton: personal conversation). But I wonder if in a certain “deeper” sense this prohibition is not founded upon the circumstance that only winter affords the leisure for telling myths, that telling them in summer would be unfitting because it would interfere with work activities?

⁷⁶ A. M. Hocart, *Ritual and Emotion* (*Character and Personality*, vol. 7, 1939, pp. 201-211), p. 208.

for the two to be interdependent. This generalization has been arrived at through induction from abstractions at the cultural level. That is, as we have sampled the evidence from various cultures we have found cases where myths have justified rituals and have appeared to be "after the fact" of ritual; we have also seen cases where new myths have given rise to new rituals. In other words, the primary conclusion which may be drawn from the data is that myths and rituals tend to be very intimately associated and to influence each other. What is the explanation of the observed connection?

The explanation is to be found in the circumstance that myth and ritual satisfy a group of identical or closely related needs of individuals. Thus far we have alluded only occasionally and often obliquely to myths and rituals as cultural forms defining individual behaviors which are adaptive or adjustive⁷⁷ responses. We have seen how myths and rituals are adaptive from the point of view of the society in that they promote social solidarity, enhance the integration of the society by providing a formalized statement of its ultimate value-attitudes, afford a means for the transmission of much of the culture with little loss of content — thus protecting cultural continuity and stabilizing the society. But how are myth and ritual rewarding enough in the daily lives of individuals so that individuals are instigated to preserve them, so that myth and ritual continue to prevail at the expense of more rational responses?

A systematic examination of this question, mainly again in terms of Navaho material, will help us to understand the prevailing interdependence of myth and ritual which has been documented. This sketch of a general theory of myth and ritual as providing a cultural storehouse of adjustive responses for individuals is to be regarded as tentative from the writer's point of view. I do not claim that the theory is proven — even in the context of Navaho culture. I do suggest that it provides a series of working hypotheses which can be tested by specifically pointed field procedures.

⁷⁷ This useful distinction I owe to my colleague, Dr. Hobart Mowrer. "Adaptation" is a purely descriptive term referring to the fact that certain types of behavior result in survival. "Adjustment" refers to those responses which remove the motivation stimulating the individual. Thus suicide is adjustive but not adaptive.

We can profitably begin by recurring to the function of myth as fulfilling the expectancy of the familiar. Both myth and ritual here provide cultural solutions to problems which all human beings face. Burke has remarked, "Human beings build their cultures, nervously loquacious, upon the edge of an abyss." In the face of want and death and destruction all humans have a fundamental insecurity.⁷⁸ To some extent, all culture is a gigantic effort to mask this, to give the future the simulacrum of safety by making activity repetitive, expective — "to make the future predictable by making it conform to the past." From one angle our own scientific mythology is clearly related to that motivation as is the obsessive, the compulsive tendency which lurks in all organized thought.

When questioned as to why a particular ceremonial activity is carried out in a particular way, Navaho singers will most often say "because the *diyin diné* — the Holy People — did it that way in the first place." The *ultima ratio* of non-literates⁷⁹ strongly tends to be "that is what our fathers said it was." An Eskimo said to Rasmussen:⁸⁰ "We Eskimos do not concern ourselves with solving all riddles. We repeat the old stories in the way they were told to us and with the words we ourselves remember." The Eskimo saying "we keep the old rules in order that we may live untroubled" is well-known. The Navaho and Eskimo thus implicitly recognize a principle which has been expressed by Harvey Ferguson⁸¹ as follows:

... man dreads both spontaneity and change, ... he is a worshipper of habit in all its forms. Conventions and institutions are merely organized and more or less sanctified habits. These are the real gods of human society, which transcend and outlive all other gods. All of them originate as group expedients which have some social value at some time, but they remain the objects of a passionate adoration long after they have outlived their usefulness. Men fight and die for them. They have their high priests, their martyrs, and their rituals. They are the working gods, whatever the ostensible ones may be.

⁷⁸ Cf. Malinowski (op. cit., p. 78): "They would screen with the vivid texture of their myths, stories, and beliefs about the spirit world, the vast emotional void gaping beyond them."

⁷⁹ There is, to be sure, at least a rough parallel in our own culture in "the Bible says so" and similar phrases.

⁸⁰ Knud Rasmussen, *Intellectual Culture of the Hudson Bay Eskimos* (Copenhagen, 1938), p. 69.

⁸¹ *Modern Man* (New York, 1936), p. 29.

These principles apply as well to standardized overt acts as to standardized forms of words. Thus Pareto considered the prevalence of ritual in all human cultures as perhaps the outstanding empirical justification for his thesis of the importance of non-logical action. Merton⁸² writes:

... activities originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted into ends in themselves. The original purposes are forgotten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes virtually obsessive. . . . Such ritualism may be associated with a mythology which rationalizes these actions so that they appear to retain their status as means, but the dominant pressure is in the direction of strict ritualistic conformity, irrespective of such rationalizations. In this sense ritual has proceeded farthest when such rationalizations are not even called forth.

Goldstein,⁸³ a neurologist, recognizes a neurological basis for the persistence of such habit systems and writes: "The organism tends to function in the accustomed manner, as long as an at least moderately effective performance can be achieved in this way."

Nevertheless, certain objections to the position as thus far developed must be anticipated and met. It must be allowed at once that the proposition "man dreads both spontaneity and change" must be qualified. More precisely put, we may say "most men, most of the time, dread both spontaneity and change in most of their activities." This formulation allows for the observed fact that most of us *occasionally* get irked with the routines of our lives or that there are certain sectors of our behavior where we fairly consistently show spontaneity. But a careful examination of the totality of behavior of any individual who is not confined in an institution or who has not withdrawn almost completely from participation in the society will show that the larger proportion of the behavior of even the greatest iconoclasts is habitual. This must be so, for by very definition a socialized organism is an organism which behaves mainly in a predictable manner. Even in a culture like contemporary American culture which has made an institutionalized value of change (both for the individual and for society), conformity

⁸² R. K. Merton, *Social Structure and Anomie* (American Sociological Review, vol. 3, 1938, pp. 672-683), p. 673.

⁸³ Kurt Goldstein, *The Organism* (New York, 1939), p. 57.

is at the same time a great virtue. To some extent, this is phrased as conformity with the latest fashion, but Americans remain, by and large, even greater conformists than most Europeans.

Existence in an organized society would be unthinkable unless most people, most of the time, behaved in an expectable manner. Rituals constitute a guarantee that in certain socially organized behaviors touching upon certain "areas of ignorance" which constitute "tender spots" for all human beings, people can count upon the repetitive nature of the phenomena. For example, in Zuni society (where rituals are highly calendrical) a man whose wife has left him or whose crops have been ruined by a torrential downpour can yet look forward to the Shalako ceremonial as something which is fixed and immutable. Similarly, the personal sorrow of the devout Christian is in some measure mitigated by anticipation of the great feasts of Christmas and Easter. Perhaps the even turn of the week with its Sunday services and mid-week prayer meetings gave a dependable regularity which the Christian clung to even more in disaster and sorrow. For some individuals daily prayer and the confessional gave the needed sense of security. Myths, likewise, give men "something to hold to." The Christian can better face the seemingly capricious reverses of his plans when he hears the joyous words "lift up your hearts." Rituals and myths supply, then, fixed points in a world of bewildering change and disappointment.

If almost all behavior has something of the habitual about it, how is it that myths and rituals tend to represent the maximum of fixity? Because they deal with those sectors of experience which do not seem amenable to rational control and hence where human beings can least tolerate insecurity. That very insistence upon the minutiae of ritual performance, upon preserving the myth to the very letter, which is characteristic of religious behavior must be regarded as a "reaction formation" (in the Freudian sense) which compensates for the actual intransigence of those events which religion tries to control.

To anticipate another objection: do these "sanctified habit systems" show such extraordinary persistence simply because

they are repeated so often and so scrupulously? Do myths and rituals constitute repetitive behavior *par excellence* not merely as reaction formations but because the habits are practiced so insistently? Perhaps myths and rituals perdure in accord with Allport's "principle of functional autonomy" ⁸⁴ — as interpreted by some writers? No, performances must be rewarded in the day to day lives of participating individuals. Sheer repetition in and of itself has never assured the persistence of any habit. If this were not so, no myths and rituals would ever have become extinct except when a whole society died out. It is necessary for us to recognize the somewhat special conditions of drive and of reward which apply to myths and rituals.

It is easy to understand why organisms eat. It is easy to understand why a defenceless man will run to escape a charging tiger. The physiological bases of the activities represented by myths and rituals are less obvious. A recent statement by a stimulus-response psychologist gives us the clue: ⁸⁵ "The position here taken is that human beings (and also other living organisms to varying degrees) can be motivated either by organic pressures (needs) that are currently felt *or* by the mere anticipation of such pressures and that those habits tend to be acquired and perpetuated (reinforced) which effect a reduction in either of these two types of motivation." That is, myths and rituals are reinforced because they reduce the anticipation of disaster. No living person has died — but he has seen others die. The terrible things which we have seen happen to others may not yet have plagued us, but our experience teaches us that these are at least potential threats to our own health or happiness.

If a Navaho gets a bad case of snow-blindness and recovers after being sung over, his disposition to go to a singer in the event of a recurrence will be strongly reinforced. And, by the

⁸⁴ As a matter of fact, Allport has made it plain (*Motivation in Personality: Reply to Mr. Bertocci, Psychological Review, 1940, vol. 47, pp. 533-555*) that he contends only that motives may be autonomous in respect to their origins but never in respect to the satisfaction of the ego (p. 547).

⁸⁵ O. H. Mowrer, *A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Anxiety and its Role as a Reinforcing Agent (Psychological Review, vol. 46, 1939, pp. 553-566)*, p. 561.

principle of generalization, he is likely to go even if the ailment is quite different. Likewise, the reinforcement will be reciprocal — the singer's confidence in his powers will also be reinforced. Finally, there will be some reinforcement for spectators and for all who hear of the recovery. That the ritual treatment rather than more rational preventatives or cures tends to be followed on future occasions can be understood in terms of the principle of the gradient of reinforcement. Delayed rewards are less effective than immediate rewards. In terms of the conceptual picture of experience with which the surrogates of his culture have furnished him, the patient *expects* to be relieved. Therefore, the very onset of the chant produces some lessening of emotional tension — in technical terms, some reduction of anxiety. If the Navaho is treated by a white physician, the "cure" is more gradual and is dependent upon the purely physico-chemical effects of the treatment. If the native wears snow goggles or practices some other form of prevention recommended by a white, the connection between the behavior and the reward (no soreness of the eyes) is so diffuse and so separated in time that reinforcement is relatively weak. Even in those cases where no improvement (other than "psychological") is effected, the realization or at any rate the final acceptance that no help was obtained comes so much later than the immediate sense of benefit⁸⁶ that the extinction effects are relatively slight.⁸⁷

Navaho myths and rituals provide a cultural storehouse of adjustive⁸⁸ responses for individuals. Nor are these limited to

⁸⁶ I have attended hundreds of Navaho ceremonials and I have never yet seen a case where the patient at some point, at least, during the ceremonial did not profess to feel an improvement. This applies even to cases where the patient was actually dying.

⁸⁷ The theory of this paragraph has been stated in the language of contemporary stimulus-response psychology. But it is interesting to note that E. S. Hartland (*Ritual and Belief*, New York) expressed essentially the same content in 1916: "Recurrence of the emotional stress would tend to be accompanied by repetition of the acts in which the reaction has been previously expressed. If the recurrence were sufficiently frequent, the form of the reaction would become a habit to be repeated on similar occasions, even where the stress was less vivid or almost absent. It can hardly be doubted that many rites owe their existence to such reactions" (pp. 116-117).

⁸⁸ It is not possible to say adaptive here because there are not infrequent occasions on which ceremonial treatment aggravates the condition or actually brings about death (which would probably not have supervened under a more rational treatment or even

the more obvious functions of providing individuals with the possibility of enhancing personal prestige through display of memory, histrionic ability, etc. Of the ten "mechanisms of defence" which Anna Freud⁸⁹ suggests that the ego has available, their myths and rituals afford the Navaho with institutionalized means of employing at least four. Reaction-formation has already been briefly discussed. Myths supply abundant materials for introjection and likewise (in the form of witchcraft myths) suggest an easy and culturally acceptable method of projection of hostile impulses. Finally, rituals provide ways of sublimation of aggression and other socially disapproved tendencies, in part, simply through giving people something to *do*.

All of these "mechanisms of ego defence" will come into context only if we answer the question "adjustive with respect to what?" The existence of motivation, of "anxiety" in Navaho individuals must be accounted for by a number of different factors. In the first place — as in every society — there are those components of "anxiety," those "threats" which may be understood in terms of the "reality principle" of psychoanalysis: life *is* hard — an unseasonable temperature, a vagary of the rainfall does bring hunger or actual starvation; people *are* organically ill. In the second place, there are various forms of "neurotic" anxiety. To some extent, every society tends to have a type anxiety. In our own society it is probably sexual, although this may be true only of those segments of our society who are able to purchase economic and physical security. In most Plains Indians sexual anxiety, so far as we can tell from the available documents, was insignificant. There the basic anxiety was for life itself and for a certain quality of that life (which I cannot attempt to characterize in a few words).

if the patient had simply been allowed to rest). From the point of view of the society, however, the rituals are with little doubt adaptive. Careful samples in two areas and more impressionistic data from the Navaho country generally indicate that the frequency of ceremonials has very materially increased concomitantly with the increase of white pressure in recent years. It is tempting to regard this as an adaptive response similar to that of the Ghost Dance and Peyote Cult on the part of other American Indian tribes.

⁸⁹ Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (London, 1937).

Among the Navaho the "type anxiety" is certainly that for health. Almost all Navaho ceremonials (essentially every ceremonial still carried out today) are curing ceremonials. And this apparently has a realistic basis. A prominent officer of the Indian Medical Service stated that it was his impression that morbidity among the Navaho is about three times that found in average white communities. In a period of four months' field work among the Navaho Drs. A. and D. Leighton found in their running field notes a total of 707 Navaho references to "threats" which they classified under six headings.⁹⁰ Of these, sixty per cent referred to bodily welfare, and are broken down by the Leightons as follows:

Disease is responsible for sixty-seven per cent, accidents for seventeen per cent, and the rest are attributed to wars and fights. Of the diseases described, eighty-one per cent were evidently organic, like smallpox, broken legs, colds, and sore throats; sixteen per cent left us in doubt as to whether they were organic or functional; and three per cent were apparently functional, with symptoms suggesting depression, hysteria, etc. Of all the diseases, forty per cent were incapacitating, forty-three per cent were not, and seventeen per cent were not sufficiently specified in our notes to judge. From these figures it can easily be seen that lack of health is a very important concern of these Navahos, and that almost half of the instances of disease that they mentioned interfered with life activities.

While I am inclined to believe that the character of this sample was somewhat influenced by the fact that the Leightons were white physicians — to whom organic illnesses, primarily, would be reported — there is no doubt that these data confirm the reality of the health "threat." In terms of clothing and shelter which are inadequate (from our point of view at least), of hygiene and diet which similarly fail to conform to our health standards, it is not altogether surprising that the Navaho need to be preoccupied with their health.⁹¹ It is unequivocally true in my experience that a greater proportion of my Navaho friends are found ill when I call upon them than of my white friends.

⁹⁰ See A. H. and D. C. Leighton, *Some Types of Uneasiness and Fear in a Navaho Indian Community* (to appear in the *American Anthropologist*, April, 1942).

⁹¹ It remains amazing that their population could have increased at such an extraordinary rate if health conditions have been so poor. Dr. A. Leighton suggests to me that it is conceivable that when the land was less crowded their health was better.

The Navaho and Pueblo Indians live in essentially the same physical environment. But Pueblo rituals are concerned predominantly with rain and with fertility. This contrast to the Navaho preoccupation with disease cannot (in the absence of fuller supporting facts) be laid to a lesser frequency of illness among the Pueblos, for it seems well documented that the Pueblos, living in congested towns, have been far more ravaged by endemic diseases than the Navaho. The explanation is probably to be sought in terms of the differing historical experience of the two peoples and in terms of the contrasting economic and social organizations. If one is living in relative isolation and if one is largely dependent (as were the Navaho at no terribly distant date) upon one's ability to move about hunting and collecting, ill health presents a danger much more crucial than to the Indian who lives in a town which has a reserve supply of corn and a more specialized social organization.

That Navaho myths and rituals are focussed upon health and upon curing has, then, a firm basis in the reality of the external world. But there is also a great deal of uneasiness arising from inter-personal relationships, and this undoubtedly influences the way the Navaho react to their illnesses. Then, too, one type of anxiousness always tends to modify others. Indeed, in view of what the psychoanalysts have taught us about "accidents" and of what we are learning from psychosomatic medicine about the psychogenic origin of many "organic" diseases we cannot regard the sources of disease among the Navaho as a closed question.⁹²

Where people live under constant threat from the physical environment, where small groups are geographically isolated and "emotional inbreeding" within the extended family group is at a maximum, inter-personal tensions and hostilities are inevitably intense. The prevalence of ill health which throws additional burdens on the well and strong is in itself an additional socially disrupting force.⁹³ But if the overt expression

⁹² It does not seem implausible that some disorders (especially perhaps those associated with acute anxieties) are examples of what Caner has called "superstitious self-protection." See G. C. Caner, *Superstitious Self-Protection* (Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 1940, vol. 44, pp. 351-361).

⁹³ Dr. A. Leighton has pointed out to me that these disruptive tendencies are re-

of aggressive impulses proceeds very far the whole system of "economic" co-operation breaks down and then sheer physical survival is more than precarious. Here myths and rituals constitute a series of highly adaptive responses from the point of view of the society. Recital of or reference to the myths reaffirms the solidarity of the Navaho sentiment system.⁹⁴ In the words of a Navaho informant: "Knowing a good story will protect your home and children and property. A myth is just like a big stone foundation — it lasts a long time." Performance of rituals likewise heightens awareness of the common system of sentiments. The ceremonials also bring individuals together in a situation where quarrelling is forbidden. Preparation for and carrying out of a chant demands intricately ramified co-operation, economic and otherwise, and doubtless thus reinforces the sense of mutual dependency.

Myths and rituals equally facilitate the adjustment of the individual to his society. Primarily, perhaps, they provide a means of sublimation of his anti-social tendencies. It is surely not without meaning that essentially all known chant myths take the family and some trouble within it as a point of departure. Let us look at Reichard's⁹⁵ generalization of the chant myth:

A number of chant legends are now available and all show approximately the same construction. People are having a hard time to secure *subsistence or have some grievance*. *A boy of the family is forbidden* to go somewhere or to do some particular thing. He does not observe the warnings and does that

inforced by one of the techniques for survival which those Navahos who have intimate and competitive relations with whites have developed. He writes: "A group threatened by a stronger group can swing to one of two poles. (a) They can coalesce and form a highly efficient, highly integrated unit that can act with swiftness, power, and precision, and in which all individuals stand or fall together. (b) They can disperse like a covey of quail so as never to present a united target to the foe. This is the Navaho method of dealing with the whites. It is every man for himself, and though individuals may fall, enough escape to survive. You don't rush to help your tribesman when trouble comes, you stay out of it, you 'let it go.' Such an attitude, however, does lead to mutual mistrust."

⁹⁴ Cf. Radcliffe-Brown (op. cit., p. 330): "... tales that might seem merely the products of a somewhat childish fancy are very far indeed from being merely fanciful and are the means by which the Andamanese express and systematize their fundamental notions of life and nature and the sentiments attaching to those notions."

⁹⁵ Gladys Reichard, *Navajo Medicine Man* (New York, 1939), p. 76. Italics mine.

which was forbidden, whereupon he embarks upon a series of adventures which keep him away from home so long that *his family despairs of his return*. . . . After the dramatic episodes, the hero returns to his home bringing with him the ritualistic lore which he teaches to *his brother*. He has been away so long and has become so accustomed to association with deity that *his own people seem impure* to him. He corrects that fault by teaching them the means of purification. . . . He has *his brother* conduct the ritual over *his sister* . . . he vanishes into the air.

While as a total explanation the following would be over-simple, it seems fair to say that the gist of this may be interpreted as follows: the chant myth supplies a catharsis for the traumata incident upon the socialization of the Navaho child. That brother and sister are the principal *dramatis personae* fits neatly with the central conflicts of the Navaho socialization process. This is a subject which I hope to treat in detail in a later paper.

Overt quarrels between family members are by no means infrequent, and, especially when drinking has been going on, physical blows are often exchanged. Abundant data indicate that Navahos have a sense of shame⁹⁶ which is fairly persistent and that this is closely connected with the socially disapproved hostile impulses which they have experienced toward relatives. It is also clear that their mistrust of others (including those in their own extended family group) is in part based upon a fear of retaliation (and this fear of retaliation is soundly based upon experience in actual life as well as, possibly, upon "unconscious guilt"). Certain passages in the myths indicate that the Navaho have a somewhat conscious realization that the ceremonials act as a cure, not only for physical illness, but also for anti-social tendencies. The following extract from the myth of the Mountain Top Way Chant will serve as an example: "The ceremony cured Dsiliyi Neyani of all his strange

⁹⁶ This is significantly reflected in ceremonial lore. Torlino, a singer of Beauty Way, said to Washington Matthews: "I am ashamed before the earth; I am ashamed before the heavens; I am ashamed before the dawn; I am ashamed before the evening twilight; I am ashamed before the blue sky; I am ashamed before the sun; *I am ashamed before that standing within me which speaks with me (my conscience)*. Some of these things are always looking at me. I am never out of sight." Washington Matthews, Navaho Legends (American Folklore Society, Memoirs, 5, 1897), pp. 58-59. Italics are mine.

feelings and notions. The lodge of his people no longer smelled unpleasant to him."⁹⁷

Thus "the working gods" of the Navaho are their sanctified repetitive ways of behavior. If these are offended by violation of the culture's system of scruples, the ceremonials exist as institutionalized means of restoring the individual to full rapport with the universe: nature and his own society.⁹⁸ Indeed "restore" is the best English translation of the Navaho word which the Navaho constantly use to express what the ceremonial does for the "patient." The associated myths reinforce the patient's belief that the ceremonial will both truly cure him of his illness and also "change" him so that he will be a better man in his relations with his family and his neighbors. An English-speaking Navaho who had just returned from jail where he had been put for beating his wife and molesting his stepdaughter said to me: "I am sure going to behave from now on. I am going to be changed — just like somebody who has been sung over."

Since a certain minimum of social efficiency is by derivation a biological necessity for the Navaho, not all of the hostility and uneasiness engendered by the rigors of the physical environment, geographical isolation, and the burdens imposed by illness is expressed or even gets into consciousness. There is a great deal of repression and this leads, on the one hand, to projection phenomena (especially in the form of phantasies that others are practicing witchcraft against one⁹⁹) and, on the other hand, the strong feelings of shame at the conscious level are matched by powerful feelings of guilt at the unconscious level. Because a person feels guilty by reason of his unconscious hostilities toward members of his family (and friends and neighbors generally), some individuals develop chronic anxie-

⁹⁷ W. Matthews, *The Mountain Chant* (Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, vol. 5, Washington, 1887, pp. 379-467), p. 417.

⁹⁸ Cf. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Taboo* (Cambridge, England, 1939), p. 44. "The primary value of ritual . . . is the attribution of ritual value to objects and occasions which are either themselves objects of important common interests linking together the persons of a community or are symbolically representative of such objects."

⁹⁹ This view is developed with full documentation in a forthcoming publication to be issued by the Peabody Museum of Harvard University in the spring of 1942.

ties. Such persons feel continually uncomfortable. They say they "feel sick all over" without specifying organic ailments other than very vaguely. They feel so "ill" that they must have ceremonials to cure them. The diagnostician and other practitioners, taking myths as their authority, will refer the cause of the illness to the patient's having seen animals struck by lightning, to a past failure to observe ritual requirements or to some similar violation of a cultural scruple. But isn't this perhaps basically a substitution of symbols acceptable to consciousness, a displacement of guilt feelings?

It is my observation that Navahos other than those who exhibit chronic or acute anxieties tend characteristically to show a high level of anxiety. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute all of this anxiety to intra-familial tensions, although it is my impression that this is the outstanding pressure. Secondary drives resultant upon culture change and upon white pressure are also of undoubted importance. And it is likewise true, as Mr. Homans¹⁰⁰ has recently pointed out, that the existence of these ritual injunctions and prohibitions (and of the concomitant myths and other beliefs) gives rise to still another variety of anxiety which Homans has well called secondary anxiety. In other words, the conceptual picture of the world which Navaho culture sets forth makes for a high threshold of anxiety in that it defines all manner of situation as fraught with peril, and individuals are instigated to anticipate danger on every hand.

But the culture, of course, prescribes not only the supernatural dangers but also the supernatural means of meeting these dangers or of alleviating their effects. Myths and rituals jointly provide systematic protection against supernatural dangers, the threats of ill health and of the physical environment, anti-social tensions, and the pressures of a more powerful society. In the absence of a codified law and of an authoritarian "chief" or other father substitute, it is only through the myth-ritual system that Navahos can make a socially supported, unified response to all of these disintegrating threats.

¹⁰⁰ G. C. Homans, *Anxiety and Ritual* (American Anthropologist, vol. 43, 1941), pp. 164-173.

The all-pervasive configurations of word symbols (myths) and of act symbols (rituals) preserve the cohesion of the society and sustain the individual, protecting him from intolerable conflict. As Hoagland ¹⁰¹ has recently remarked:

Religion appears to me to be a culmination of this basic tendency of organisms to react in a configurational way to situations. We must resolve conflicts and disturbing puzzles by closing some sort of a configuration, and the religious urge appears to be a primitive tendency, possessing biological survival value, to unify our environment so that we can cope with it.

V

The Navaho are only one case.¹⁰² The specific adaptive and adjustive responses performed by myth and ritual will be differently phrased in different societies according to the historical experience of these societies (including the specific opportunities they have had for borrowing from other cultures), in accord with prevalent configurations of other aspects of the culture, and with reference to pressures exerted by other societies and by the physical and biological environment. But the general nature of the adaptive and adjustive responses performed by myth and ritual appears very much the same in all human groups. Hence, although the relative importance of myth and of ritual does vary greatly, the two tend universally to be associated.

For myth and ritual have a common psychological basis. Ritual is an obsessive repetitive activity — often a symbolic dramatization of the fundamental “needs” of the society, whether “economic,” “biological,” “social,” or “sexual.” Mythology is the rationalization of these same needs, whether they are all expressed in overt ceremonial or not. Someone has said “every culture has a type conflict and a type solution.”

¹⁰¹ Hudson Hoagland, *Some Comments on Science and Faith* (In: Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, New York, 1941, mimeographed), p. 5.

¹⁰² But I was very much struck in reading Dr. Hallowell's recent article (A. I. Hallowell, *The Social Function of Anxiety in a Primitive Society*, *American Sociological Review*, vol. 6, December, 1941, pp. 869-882) — which I read only when this paper was in proof — at the similarity not only in the interpretations he reached but at that in the data from the Saulteaux, when he says “fear of disease is a major social sanction” (p. 871) that fits the Navaho case precisely — as does “illness due to having done bad things or to transgression of a parent” (p. 873).

Ceremonials tend to portray a symbolic resolvment of the conflicts which external environment, historical experience, and selective distribution of personality types¹⁰³ have caused to be characteristic in the society. Because different conflict situations characterize different societies, the "needs" which are typical in one society may be the "needs" of only deviant individuals in another society. And the institutionalized gratifications (of which rituals and myths are prominent examples) of culturally recognized needs vary greatly from society to society. "Culturally recognized needs" is, of course, an analytical abstraction. Concretely, "needs" arise and exist only in specific individuals. This we must never forget, but it is equally important that myths and rituals, though surviving as functioning aspects of a coherent culture only so long as they meet the "needs" of a number of concrete individuals, are, in one sense, "supra-individual." They are usually composite creations; they normally embody the accretions of many generations, the modifications (through borrowing from other cultures or by intra-cultural changes) which the varying needs of the group as a whole and of innovating individuals in the group have imposed. In short, both myths and rituals are cultural products, part of the social heredity of a society.

¹⁰³ This selective distribution of personality types may become established biologically, through the operation of genetic mechanisms, or through the processes of child socialization operative in the particular culture.

A NOTE ON THE EPITAPH OF TERENTIUS

In this Journal, Vol. XXXIV, 1941, page 79, Mr. Welles published with a scholarly commentary the interesting epitaph of the tribune Terentius from Dura. The place in which it was found, in a private house, presents difficulties to him. He supposes that the stone was set into the epistyle and smashed when falling down from it and takes great pains to prove that Terentius was not buried in the house. This is evident. I think the solution is very simple. Only the first seven lines and the first half of the eighth are incised, from the word *θεαι* the letters are painted in red. It is a well-known ancient custom to paint the letters in order to guide the stone-cutter in his work. Consequently the cutting of the inscription is unfinished. It is not remarkable that the cutting was done in the house before the stone was transported to the cemetery. By some chance which we cannot know it was left unfinished and the stone smashed by an accident. There is no reason to assume that it was set into the epistyle, the traces of plaster can be explained otherwise, e.g., from the stone being re-used.

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SWEDEN

SOME OBJECTIONS TO OLD NORSE ÞJAZI = SANSKRIT TVASṬR

IN AN article entitled "The Role of Loki in Germanic Mythology" published in this Review,¹ the late F. Stanton Cawley, acting upon a suggestion made in a Harvard dissertation of 1938 by Dean Gilbert T. Hoag of Kenyon College,² attempted to show that þjazi, the name of the giant who in an Old Norse myth carries off Iðunn and her apples, could be etymologically connected with Tvaṣṭr, the name of one of the chief Vedic gods. The philological reasoning which led him to this conclusion he published also in slightly more extended form, and for a rather larger public, in Paul & Braune's *Beiträge* ³ under the heading of "Loki und *Tekþtr, ein bisher unbekannter indogermanischer Gott." The conclusion of these studies was stated as follows: "An Indo-European myth of the theft of the divine drink by the god *Tekþtr, of the culture-hero type, was transmitted in India and in Germanic territory to the literary period. In India the name was preserved (Tvaṣṭar), but the role of the thief was taken over in most versions by the bird Garuḍa and the god Indra, or Indra in eagle-form. The Teutons, on the contrary, kept the culture-hero in his original role — *behsturaz at first, and later Logapōre-Lóðurr-Loki (the last a hypocoristic form . . .), when the god's by-name 'the crafty one' had displaced his original name 'the fashioner,' 'the creator'." ⁴

Now, however reasonable this theory may be to the Germanic mythologist, from the Sanskrit point of view it seems *a priori* at least unlikely that Logapōre-Lóðurr-Loki is to be identified with Tvaṣṭr, or, indeed, that any stronger tie exists between them than a merely interesting similarity of the parts they play in the Norse and Indian versions of a myth which in its original form was the heritage of the entire Indo-European speech-community. Thanks to Cawley's clearing of the ground, however, we are no longer dependent upon opinion, for in the two studies mentioned above he has presented detailed philological argument in support of Hoag's hypothesis. In a problem

¹ Volume XXXII, No. 4, October, 1939, 309-327.

² Entitled *Two Norse Myths of the Thieving Hawk*. (Typewritten copy deposited in the Archives of Harvard University, Widener Library.) Nothing in this article is intended to dispute the findings of Hoag's dissertation. The denial of any etymological connection between þjazi and Tvaṣṭr in no way disturbs the relationship between the two Norse myths.

³ 63 Band, 3 Heft, 1939, 457-465.

⁴ The Harvard Theological Review, XXXII, 325-326.

of this kind (as can hardly be too often repeated) linguistic evidence is the only pure gold, and philological method the only true touchstone. This part of the very great problem of Loki may, therefore, be reduced to the relatively much simpler question whether Cawley's etymology of *þjazi* is correct. The evidence of this paper is to show that it is not.⁵ The corollary is that the suggested complex of *þjazi*-Logapöore-Lóðurr- and (most importantly) -Loki cannot by this means be directly related to the Vedic god *Tvaṣṭr*.

Cawley begins his argument with the hypothetical Indo-European form **Tekṛtr*.⁶ From this base he then derives the Primitive Germanic **þehstur-*, which he proposes to change to an *a*-stem noun and to present in the Prim. Gmc. nominative as **þehsturaz*. Even this first step is not without hazard, for the *-tr* suffix of the IE form (originally used to form *nomina agentis*) occurs regularly only in Sanskrit, Greek, Italic, or Slavic derivatives and is not normally to be expected in the Germanic languages.⁷ This obstacle may, however, possibly be disregarded in the case of a proper noun; and what little evidence exists in support of this assumption has been properly quoted.⁸ Caution, nevertheless, reminds us that we are already dealing in exceptions.

From the *a*-stem form **þehsturaz* Cawley next derives by syncope **þehstra*, assuming "a loss in adaptation to the monosyllabic stem-form of **þunr-aR*, the primitive Norse name of the great thunder-god Thor, with whom Loki in the mythological tales is constantly associated."⁹ That is a large assumption indeed, for, as Cawley himself acknowledges, the *u* would normally remain. The normal effect of this *u*, moreover, no matter whether it were vocalic or consonantal,

⁵ I deeply regret not having expressed my long-held doubts regarding this matter to Professor Cawley, who was my teacher, and a kind friend. It was not, however, until a few weeks ago that I found it imperative to examine scientifically the connection of Norse *þjazi* with Sanskrit *Tvaṣṭr*. Had Professor Cawley been alive, this article would have gone first to him for a reply. His untimely death has prevented that duty.

⁶ Cf. Walde-Pokorny, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, 1, 717, for other derivatives of IE **tekṛ*, among them Sanskrit *Tvaṣṭr*.

⁷ Cf. Brugmann, *Kurze Vergleichende Grammatik*, page 332, paragraph 409, 3.

⁸ Cf. Cawley's note 5 to page 462 of his article in *Beiträge*: "Fr. Kluge, *Nom. Stammbildungslehre* # 30: 'Das Bildungselement in ags. *ealdor*, *bealdor*, 'Fürst' — an. *baldr* (mit gramm. Wechsel zu germ. *balpa*- 'kühn' gebildet) enthält wahrscheinlich das in den verwandten Sprachen weitverbreitete Suffix *tr*, das zur Bildung von nom. agent. diente; dazu auch ahd. *smeidar* 'artifex'?'." But even here [my comment, M.F.] the perfectly regular development and inflection of the noun *Baldr*, likewise the name of a god, should be observed (i.e. gen. *Baldrs*, dat. *Baldri*).

⁹ The Harvard Theological Review, XXXII, 323.

would be to induce "u breaking" and to produce at this stage in the argument a form **þiqhst(u)ra(z)*,¹⁰ from which Old Norse *þjazi* could not be derived. It is only by appeal to a most exceptional analogy that this really critical objection is passed by.¹¹

The form **þehstra*, however, being assumed, Cawley now, by the loss of the *h* (> **þestra*), and by the effect of "a-breaking," arrives at **þjastra*, which, with late syncope of the stem-vowel *a*, gives **þjastr*. To this he then adds the determinative *-si*, having thus **þjastr-si* > **þjastsi*, and finally through dissimilation producing the required form **þjatsi* (= *þjazi*). As will be shown briefly below, more detailed evidence of validity for some of these steps is needed (particularly for the loss of the *h* and the ensuing changes); but in the face of more fundamental difficulties in the development of **þestra*, these may well, for the present purpose, be overlooked.

The greatest single objection to the impeccability of Cawley's proof is his use of exceptional development as part of his argument; a second, and almost as serious, criticism may be made of the order in which he has drawn up his sound-changes, for the normal sequence of regular mutations would hardly produce ON *þjazi* from **þehsturaz*. The first change would be the loss of *h*¹² (> **þesturaz*); the second

¹⁰ An example of "u-breaking" may be found in the interesting divine name *Fiörgynn* (*Lokasenna*, 26, in the genitive case); or in ON *fiqr* compared with Gothic *fairhws* 'life.' The phenomenon is a common one: cf. Heusler, *Altisländisches Elementarbuch* (3 Auflage), page 24, paragraph 76; Noreen, *Altisländische Grammatik* (4 Auflage), page 87, paragraph 89. The purely hypothetical form **þiqhst(u)ra(z)*, written (thus) with all sounds remaining, is impossible at any stage of the language. It is used here only to follow Cawley's argument at this point. (No such form is imputed to him.) The proper complex of sounds which would occur at the period of breaking is given below in the discussion of the sequence of sound-changes.

¹¹ Analogy is, even at the very best, a weak and despairing last resort. The strictest philological method will not admit it as proof unless the conditions which would bring it about can be so completely described as to show its inevitability. In this instance, since the suggested adaptation is of one hypothetical form (**þehsturaz*) to another (**þunr-aR*), these conditions cannot possibly be depicted.

¹² At this point there are many difficulties: (1) The exact quality of the sound represented by the IE symbol *þ* after *ĥ* is not known (cf. Brugmann, *Grundriss*, I, 2, page 790, paragraph 919), and, consequently, whether in the Germanic languages its derivative is to be classified with other *s*-sounds remains quite speculative; therefore, (2) it is not certain whether the *h* in **þehst-* is to be treated precisely as if occurring in any other *-hst-* complex wherein the *s* is of different origin. (3) Whether *h* before *-st* would fall without compensatory lengthening of the preceding vowel is likewise debatable on the grounds of insufficient evidence. (Cf. Jakob Sverdrup, *IF*, 35, 1915, page 163; Noreen, *op. cit.*, page 163, paragraph 222, 2; Heusler (who expresses greater certainty), *op. cit.*, page 52, paragraph 168.) The most likely assumption is that the *h* would fall without any compensatory reaction elsewhere; but it remains only an assumption. (In

(possibly the first; certainly not the last) would be the syncope of the weak stem-vowel. The development to this point would thus be **þesturaz* > **þesturaR* > **þesturr* and probably to **þestur*, precisely as in ON *akr* (<**akrr*), compared with Gothic *akrs*, Greek ἀκρός, and in ON *aldr* compared with Gothic *alds*, or in the Norse proper name Óttarr (an *i*-stem noun) which retains the double *r* final (cf. OE *Othere*). This loss of the *a* would have occurred toward the end of the Primitive Norse period (c. 650); no other vowel-syncope would normally have preceded it.¹³ From this form **þesturr* the next regular step would be by "u-breaking" to **þjosturr* (cf. ON *jotunn* <**etunar*, which in all essential details is precisely similar). This last would be, presumably, the regular Old Norse proper name to be derived from the Primitive Germanic **þehsturaz*. In the latest literary Old Norse the name **þjosturr* would be written and probably pronounced *þjostur*.¹⁴ Confirmation, in fact, of the form *þjosturr* is given by Cawley's own quotation of the (attested) name *þestólfr*, compared with *þjóstólfr*, as "confirming the assumption that the ON *a* in *þjazi* goes back to IE *e*"; for **þest-* (as shown above) is precisely the "unbroken" form of **þjost-*. Granting, then, in the case of a proper noun, every possible variant (but no completely extraneous development), the possibilities are *þjosturr*, *þesturr* ("unbroken"), even *þjósturr* (with compensatory lengthening of the preceding vowel); but not *þjastr*, and therefore not *þjazi*.

It is therefore submitted that the derivation of *þjazi* from Primitive Germanic **þehsturaz* is incorrect; and that *þjazi* and *Tvastr* are not etymologically related.

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the concluding argument of this paper allowance is made for the possibility of lengthening of the preceding vowel at some stage in the process.) For the dating of the change see the reference to Noreen above.

¹³ For the normal sequence of ON syncope cf. Heusler, op. cit., page 34, paragraph 108, and the further references there given. It should perhaps be noted that, according to this order of changes, *a* would be lost without causing umlaut of the preceding *u* because the primary accent would not be on the *u*. The parallel is exact in ON *jotunn* (quoted below). From the resulting form **þesturr* an appeal to adaptation to **þunr-aR* can, of course, no longer be made.

¹⁴ Cf. Noreen, op. cit., page 87, paragraph 89.

¹⁵ I record my indebtedness to the American Council of Learned Societies for a study aid which has made possible (among other things) the preparation of this note.